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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis contributes to two completely unrelated debates in the economic literature, similar 
only in the relatively high degree of controversy characterizing each one.  
The first part is methodological and macroeconomic in nature, addressing the question of 
whether the distribution of income across countries is converging (i.e. are the poor catching 
up to the rich?) or diverging (i.e. are we witnessing the formation of two exclusive clubs, one 
for poor countries and another one for rich countries?). Applications of the simple Markov 
model to this question have generated evidence in favor of the divergence hypothesis. In the 
first chapter, I critically review these results. I use statistical inference to show that the 
divergence results are not statistically robust, and I explain that this instability of the results 
comes from the application of a model for discrete data to data that is actually continuous. In 
the second chapter, I reposition the whole convergence-divergence debate by placing it in the 
context of Silverman’s classic survey of non-parametric density estimation techniques. This 
allows me to use the basic notions of fuzzy logic to adapt the simple Markov chain model to 
continuous data. When I apply the newly adapted Markov chain model to the cross-country 
distribution question, I find evidence against the divergence hypothesis, and this evidence is 
statistically robust.  
The second part of the thesis is empirical and microeconomic in nature. I question whether 
observed differences between husbands’ and wives’ participation in labor markets are due to 
different preferences or to different constraints. My identification strategy is based on the idea 
that the more power an individual has relative to his/her partner, the more his/her actions will 
reflect his/her preferences. I use 2001 PSID data on cohabiting couples to estimate a 
simultaneous equations model of the spousal time allocation decision. My results confirm the 
stylized fact that specialization and trade does not explain time allocation for couples in which 
the wife is the primary breadwinner, and suggest that power could provide a more general 
explanation of the observations. My results show that wives with relatively more power 
choose to work more on the labor market and less at home, whereas husbands with more 
power choose to do the opposite. Since women start out from a lower level of labor market 
participation than men do, it would seem that spouses’ agree that the ideal mix of market 
work and housework lies somewhere between the husbands’ and the wives’ current positions.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 This thesis is composed of two very different parts that share one common element. 
The first part is methodological and macroeconomic and the second part is empirical and 
microeconomic, but both parts address very basic questions that have been the source of much 
controversy in the economic literature. In the first part, the question is whether or not the 
distribution of income across countries is converging, and in the second part, the question is 
whether or not labor market outcomes reflect labor market preferences for women. 
 
Part I: The dynamics of cross-country income distribution 
 
The simple Markov chain model has been widely used in the social sciences to study 
the phenomenon of mobility. Empirical applications have included geographic, labor, and 
social mobility. The prime attraction in this approach lies in the simplicity with which short-
run dynamics are translated into long-run tendencies. One active area of research in which the 
short and long-run properties of a panel of data are of particular interest is the study of the 
distribution of income across countries. In this body of literature, the simple Markov chain 
model plays a particularly controversial role. Quah uses this model to paint a new picture of 
the world in which the rich and the poor are diverging to form ‘twin peaks’.  
 
Chapter1: On the robustness of the twin-peaked ergodic distribution of income across 
countries 
 
In the first chapter, I contest the robustness of the twin peaks conclusion, questioning 
the suitability of this discrete model to analyse continuous data on income. First, I use a filter 
to clean the data of any short-run noise. This procedure enhances the twin-peaked result. 
Second, I introduce the use of statistical inference to the debate and show that the long-run 
distribution is exceedingly unstable. The confidence region for the estimated twin-peaked 
long-run distribution includes unimodal and trimodal distributions. Third, I derive an 
analytical expression defining this instability. This expression reveals that the shape of the 
long-run distribution is entirely determined by the relatively few observations of country 
mobility, and not at all determined by the relatively many observations of country immobility. 
So, I take a closer look at the few observations of mobility, and realize that many of these 
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observations are not really observations of mobility at all, but rather observations of short-run 
noise. This short-run noise is generated by the discretization of the continuous income 
variable that is necessary in order to apply the discrete Markov chain model. The filter applied 
in the first section cleans up this short-run noise, but this exacerbates the fragility of the 
ergodic distribution. In Chapter 2, fuzzification provides a solution to this problem. 
 
Chapter 2: Fuzzifying the cross-country income convergence debate 
 
In the second chapter, I study the causes underlying this breakdown of the simple 
Markov chain model and I propose a simple solution that uses notions imported from the 
domain of fuzzy logic to adapt the simple Markov chain model to continuous data.  
 
I begin by redefining the cross-country income convergence debate in two manners. 
First, I return to first principles, reviewing the basics of Markov chain modelling. The 
literature has concentrated its efforts on space-discretization, completely ignoring the issue of 
time-discretization. However, discrete observations of a fundamentally continuous process 
can only be modelled as a Markov chain if space and time discretization has been carried out 
properly. Second, I place the issue of space-discretization in the context of Silverman’s classic 
survey of non-parametric density estimation techniques. This view of the transition matrix 
estimation process reveals some very basic drawbacks in the most common estimation 
techniques and suggests easy ways of improving upon these techniques. The fuzzification of 
the simple Markov chain model that is developed in the rest of the chapter represents one such 
improvement.   
 
Taking this non-parametric view of the estimation process, I examine the short-run 
noise generated by the application of a discrete model to continuous data. This short-run noise 
can be classified into two groups, the first one containing observations of short-run dynamics 
and the second one containing observations tainted by measurement error. In order to address 
these two very different problems, fuzzification of the simple Markov chain model is carried 
out in two different ways. First, instead of using point income levels to define the different 
income classes, intervals of income are used to delineate the frontiers between the different 
classes of income. The income class frontiers are fuzzified. Second, point observations of 
income are replaced by distributions across intervals of income, the widths of which are 
proportional to the quality of the underlying data. The income observations are fuzzified. 
General Introduction 
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When fuzzification is carried out (and other corrections are made), the long-run distribution of 
income across countries becomes unimodal, and this time the results are statistically robust. 
 
Part II: The dynamics of intra-household time allocation 
 
Chapter 3: Nature versus Nurture: An empirical analysis of the division of labor within 
American couples 
 
Less women than men participate in the American labor market, and when women do 
participate, they work less hours on average than men. Why are women less active on average 
than men on the labor market? Is it nature or nurture, choice or constraint? My results show 
that observed labor market participation does not reflect true preferences. 
 
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on cohabiting couples for 
2001 and show that the effective labor market supply of the women is constrained at levels 
that are lower than desired. In order to identify true preferences I assume that the more power 
an individual has relative to his/her partner, the more his/her actions will reflect his/her 
preferences. Four proxies for power are used: age, education, wage and local sex ratios. A 
system of four simultaneous equations is used to model the couples’ allocation of time 
between house and market work. The regressions generate the following results.  
 
For American ‘wives,’ an increased share of the total education and wages for the 
couple is accompanied by an increased probability of working longer hours on the labor 
market and shorter hours at home. For example, a ‘typical’ woman with 4 years of college 
education and an average wage, who is living with a man with less education and a lower 
wage, has 14% less chance of working part-time and 11% more chance of working full-time 
when compared to the same woman who is living with a man with equal education and a 
similar wage. So this same woman will most probably work full-time when she is in the 
relatively more powerful situation with respect to her partner, and part-time when she is in the 
less powerful situation. Note that this is not a specialization and trade story because for this to 
be the case, the opposite would have to hold true for men, and this is not the case.  
 
For American ‘husbands,’ an increased concentration of women in the population is 
accompanied by an increased probability of working shorter hours on the labor market and 
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longer hours at home. For example, a ‘typical’ man who is living in a state where 50% of the 
population in his age-bracket is female has 10% less chance of working 40-45 hours a week 
and 10% more chance of working more than 45 hours a week, when compared to the same 
man living in a state where 51% of the population in his age-bracket is female. So this same 
man will most probably have a ‘small’ full-time job when he is in the more powerful situation 
with respect to his partner and a ‘big’ full-time job when he is in the less powerful situation. 
 
These results suggest that men and women are more similar in their preferences on the 
work-family trade-off than the labor market statistics reveal. Women do less market work and 
more housework than husbands, but they would like to do more market work and less 
housework. Men do more market work and less housework than women, but they would like 
to do less market work and more housework. Men and women seem to agree that the ideal 
place to be is somewhere in between. 
 5 
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Chapter 1 
On the Robustness of the Twin-peaked Ergodic 
Distribution of Income across Countries 
 
Abstract: The very basics of statistical inference are surprisingly absent from empirical 
applications of the simple Markov chain model. This paper develops three tools in an effort to 
remedy the situation. Confidence intervals for the estimated transition probabilities are 
analytically derived, and confidence intervals for the resulting ergodic probabilities are 
numerically calculated. The notion of the elasticity of the ergodic probabilities with respect to 
the transition probabilities is developed and quantified. These tools are applied within the 
context of the cross-country income convergence debate. In the literature on convergence, the 
simple Markov chain model indicates evolution towards a twin-peaked world. Although 
cleansing the ergodic distribution of income across countries of short-run noise reinforces its 
twin-peaked shape, these twin peaks are not statistically significant. Moreover, the specific 
type high immobility reflected by the data on income renders the estimated transition matrix 
particularly prone to the generation of twin-peaked ergodic distributions. 
 
Keywords: Ergodic distribution; Filters; Income distribution; Markov chains; Twin peaks. 
 
JEL classification: C23; O57.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The simple Markov chain model has been widely used in the social sciences to study 
the phenomenon of mobility. Empirical applications have included geographic, labor, and 
social mobility. The prime attraction in this approach lies in the simplicity of the 
characterization of the steady state. One active area of research in which the long run 
properties of a panel of data are of particular interest is the study of the distribution of income 
across countries. In this body of literature, Quah’s (1993a,b) application of the simple Markov 
chain model reveals evidence of a world in which the rich and the poor are diverging to form 
‘twin peaks’. In what follows, the robustness of this conclusion is assessed.  
 
The tools available for the assessment of the robustness of the twin-peaked shape of 
the ergodic distribution are surprisingly scarce. Statistical inference on Markov chains is 
basically limited to hypothesis testing on the transition probabilities. In this paper, I derive 
confidence intervals for the transition probabilities analytically, and confidence intervals for 
the ergodic probabilities numerically. When I calculate these confidence intervals for the 
cross-country income distribution application, I find that the confidence region for the 
transition probability matrix is small, but that the confidence region for the ergodic 
distribution is large enough to contain all sorts of different shaped distributions. I conclude 
that the twin-peaked result is not statistically robust. 
 
This result highlights the fragility of the simple Markov chain model when applied in 
certain empirical settings. In this paper, I use the economic concept of elasticity to derive an 
analytical expression for this fragility. This expression allows me to quantify the fragility and 
to identify the causes of the fragility. I show that the certain type of high immobility displayed 
by the underlying data first imposes a very particular functional form upon the ergodic 
distribution, and then situates the analysis in the degenerate part of the domain of this 
particular ergodic function. Calculation of this elasticity could help researchers assess whether 
or not the simple Markov chain model is indeed appropriate for the modelling of their data.   
 
In Section 1, the data is filtered of business cycle type fluctuations. In theory, the long-
run distribution is independent of short-run noise; however, in practice, this is not the case 
because the sample is finite. The simple Markov chain model calls for discrete data, yet 
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empirical applications are based on continuous data. This introduces short-run noise into the 
estimation process which in turn contaminates the long-run distribution (because the sample is 
finite). It is found that filtering the data reinforces the twin peaks result. In Section 2, 
statistical inference is carried out. Section 2.1 presents the analytical derivation of the 
confidence intervals for the transition probabilities. Section 2.2 presents the numerical 
calculations of the confidence intervals for the ergodic probabilities. In Section 3, the 
analytical expressions for the elasticities of the ergodic probabilities with respect to the 
transition probabilities are derived. A discussion of the implications of these expressions is 
carried out. In Section 4, conclusions are presented. 
 
2.   Filter 
 
First, let us establish notation. There are a finite number of states m ),...,1( mi =  and 
transitions between these states are observed at regular intervals for a finite length of time T 
),...,1( Tt = . Let )(tN  be the matrix of observed transitions at time t where the ijth element is 
)(tnij  (the number of transitions from state i to state j observed at time t), and let )(tn  be the 
distribution of the observations across the states at time t where the ith element is )(tni  (the 
number of observations in state i at time t). We assume that the observed transitions are 
generated by a simple (i.e. of order one) time-homogenous Markov chain according to the 
matrix of transition probabilities P where the ijth element is pij (the probability of transiting 
from state i to state j). The maximum likelihood estimator of P is denoted Pˆ , where the ijth 
element is: 
 
 
( )
( )åå
å
= =
== m
j
T
t
ij
T
t
ij
ij
tn
tn
p
1 1
1ˆ .                                                                                                        (1) 
 
The model can then be summarized by the following expression:  
 
( ) ( ) 1)0(1 +==+ tPnPtntn .                                                                                           (2) 
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In this paper, we are interested in the long-run tendencies of the distribution of the 
observations (i.e. the ergodic distribution), so we let t  go to ¥ , and we get:  
 
¥=¥=¥ PnPnn )0()()( .                                                                                             (3) 
 
The middle term tells us that the ergodic distribution is nothing other than the left eigenvector 
corresponding to the unit eigenvalue of the transition matrix. The term on the right tells us 
that the rows of the transition matrix converge to the ergodic distribution as t  approaches ¥ . 
These two pieces of information will be useful to us in Section 3.2. 
 
Second, let us review Quah's application of the simple Markov chain model. The data 
used is the Laspeyres index of annual real per capita income from the Summers and Heston 
(1991) Penn World Tables for 118 countries (relative to the world average) for the 1962-84 
time period. Five possible states are defined by discretizing the set of possible values of 
relative incomes into intervals at 1/4, 1/2, 1, and 2. The results are presented below:  
 
27.016.016.018.024.0)(
99.001.0000
02.094.004.000
004.092.004.00
0004.092.005.0
00003.097.0
ˆ
=¥
=
Quah
Quah
n
P
                                          (4)      
                           
The estimated ergodic distribution indicates an evolution towards a bipolar world of haves 
and have-nots. 
 
Third, let us start out our analysis by reproducing Quah’s results. Reestimation of the 
transition probability matrix and recalculation of the corresponding ergodic distribution using 
data from a more recent version of the Penn World Tables (i.e. Mark 5.6) turns out to be 
surprisingly revealing. The sample is composed of the 111 countries for which there is 
continuously available data for the period 1960-89, that is the 118 countries used by Quah 
(1993a,b) minus Afghanistan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nepal, Iraq, and Tanzania. The results 
are presented below: 
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22.012.017.019.030.0)(
99.001.0000
02.095.003.000
002.095.003.00
0003.091.006.0
00004.096.0
ˆ
0
0
=¥
=
-
-
Hites
Hites
n
P
                                                             (5) 
  
This estimated transition matrix is very similar to the one calculated by Quah, but it generates 
an ergodic distribution with a rather different economic interpretation. Although the ergodic 
distribution is still twin peaked, it is the poorest class, and not the richest class as before, that 
absorbs the biggest portion of the population. In other words, just data inaccuracies would 
constitute a sufficiently big perturbation to the estimated transition matrix to alter the ergodic 
distribution in an economically significant manner. 
 
Finally, let us turn to the issue of filtering. In the simple Markov chain model, the 
estimated transition probability matrix is used to extract information concerning the mobility 
of countries within the distribution of incomes. This information is camouflaged by two 
sources of noise. The first is generated by inaccuracies in the data and will not be discussed 
here. The second results from using continuous data to estimate a discrete model (i.e. from 
translating continuous data into discrete data by defining income class frontiers) and will be 
discussed below. Whereas the first source of noise affects the inference in ways that are 
unknown to us, the second source of noise can be observed directly. 
  
In the simple Markov chain model, transitions represent mobility. In reality, however, 
transitions can occur for two reasons. Transitions can result from higher (or lower) than 
average world growth in a country (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Transitions resulting from higher than average world growth 
States
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 Time
 
 
This is what we call mobility and this is what we would like to measure. Transitions can also 
result from business cycle type variations in a country's income when the level of income is 
situated very close to one defining a frontier between classes (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Transitions resulting from business cycle type variations 
States
1
2
3
4
5
1 2 3 4 5 Time
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This is clearly not mobility and since such transitions are included in our calculation of 
mobility, it is necessary to purge the data of such noise. In sum, we need to correct for the 
bias that short run fluctuations in income introduce into the calculation of long run tendencies 
in the distribution of world incomes.1 
 
Two remarks are in order. First, the noise introduced by business cycle type 
fluctuations at frontiers between income classes only affects estimates of the probability of 
transitions between adjacent states, that is estimates of the elements on the diagonals just 
above and below the main diagonal of the transition probability matrix. Given the tri-diagonal 
structure and the stochastic nature (i.e. all rows sum to one) of the estimated transition 
probability matrices, all elements of the estimated transition probability matrices are 
potentially affected by this noise. Second, although the business cycle type fluctuations at 
frontiers between income classes that do not constitute mobility but are recorded as such 
compensate for real mobility that occurs within classes and is therefore not recorded as such, 
the former over compensates for the latter (see Figures 3 to 6). We conclude from these two 
remarks that we would expect the elements on the main diagonal of the estimated transition 
probability matrix to be underestimated, the rest of the elements to be overestimated, and 
therefore mobility to be overestimated. 
 
In order to cleanse the data, it is necessary to tighten the conditions under which a 
transition is considered to represent mobility. Here this is achieved by requiring a transition to 
last a minimum number of periods in order for it to be counted as mobility, this minimum 
number of periods being defined as just over the average number of periods spanned by a 
business cycle. Four increasingly fine filters are applied to the original data. The first filter 
counts transitions as mobility if they last for at least one year, that is if no transition is 
observed during the year following the initial transition. The second, third and fourth filters 
do the same for two, three and four year spans, respectively. The results obtained from 
application of these four filters are presented below: 
 
                                                 
1 This is an estimation problem arising from the bias introduced into the transition matrix by fitting a discrete 
model to a finite sample of continuous data. In theory, the ergodic distribution is independent of short run noise.  
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Two observations are interesting to note. First, of the 127 transitions initially counted, 
almost half are due to short-term fluctuations in income and not the long-term tendencies that 
we are trying to measure. Indeed, of the 127 transitions initially counted, 29 (15, 12 and 4, 
respectively) lasted less than two (three, four and five, respectively) years (see Figure 7). 
Second, the application of increasingly fine filters reinforces the twin peaked shape of the 
ergodic distribution. In very rough terms, comparing the ergodic distribution calculated from 
the most finely filtered data to the ergodic distribution calculated from the unfiltered data, the 
part of the distribution falling into the poorest class (left hand peak) increases by 20% to reach 
50%, the part of the distribution falling into the richest class (right hand peak) remains at 
20%, and the part of the distribution falling into the middle classes decreases uniformly.  
 
In sum, when the data is purged of short run noise, the evidence for twin peaks is 
reinforced. But just how robust is this evidence? In the next section, statistical inference is 
carried out. 
 
3.   Statistical inference 
 
The results presented in the previous section are not complete. What is missing is 
information on the precision of these results. In most empirical contexts, point estimates are 
necessarily reported along with their confidence intervals. In this particular context of applied 
Markov chain analysis, such information is intriguingly never provided (see any of the 
references cited in the bibliography), a point made by Reichlin (1999) in her discussion of 
Quah (1999). In this section, the confidence region for the ergodic distribution is derived. 
This is done in two steps. In Section 3.1, the confidence intervals for each of the transition 
probabilities are first derived. In Section 3.2, these confidence intervals are then mapped onto 
the space inhabited by the ergodic distribution. Because of the multidimensionality of the 
problem, this mapping is carried out numerically, rather than analytically.  
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3.1   Transition probability matrix 
 
In this paper I am concerned about the robustness of the twin-peaked shape of the 
ergodic distribution. Variations in the ergodic distribution are generated by variations in the 
elements of the transition probability matrix. Therefore, the confidence region for the ergodic 
distribution depends upon the confidence region for the transition probability matrix. 
Anderson and Goodman (1957) study the asymptotic properties of first-order Markov chains 
and derive such a confidence region. They show that, for each state i, under the null 
hypothesis ijij pp ~ˆ =  ),...,1,( mji = : 
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where å ==
T
t i
T
i tnn 0 )(  and ijp
~  are the theoretical transition probabilities under the null 
hypothesis. This allows them to define the confidence region as the set of ijp~  for which 
Equation (7) is less than or equal to the a  significance point of the relevant chi-square 
distribution: 
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In what follows, we will use these results to explicitly define the limits of the confidence 
intervals for the individual transition probabilities ijp . 
 
These results need to be slightly adapted to the situation at hand. Equation (7) is 
derived under the assumption that every 0>ijp , which is clearly not the case here.2 
Nevertheless, we can circumvent this problem by simply neglecting the zeros in each row. 
Indeed, we are not interested in testing whether these elements are truly zero (i.e. I accept that 
certain degrees of income mobility do not occur.); rather, we are interested in testing whether 
                                                 
2 Anderson and Goodman’s test statistic is an asymptotic result, valid only for sufficiently large samples (i.e. 
those for which the expected frequency in each of the cells of the transition matrix is superior to 5). 
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the positive elements are significantly different from some theoretically interesting values (i.e. 
I want to evaluate whether the observations of mobility are compatible with certain stories.). 
So, if I discard the three zeros present in the first row of the estimated transition probability 
matrix, I am left with two values that sum to one. The remains of this first row look like a row 
of an estimated transition probability matrix resulting from the estimation of a two-state 
Markov chain model, and I treat it as such. I do the same for the remaining rows. The first and 
the fifth rows of the estimated transition matrix are treated as the results from the estimation 
of a two-state Markov chain model (i.e. 251 == mm ), and the second to fourth rows are 
treated as the results from the estimation of a three-state Markov chain (i.e. 
3432 === mmm ). Each row has a 
2c  distribution with 1-im  degrees of freedom and since 
these rows are asymptotically independent, they can be added to obtain a 2c  distribution with 
å
=
-
m
i
im
1
)1(  degrees of freedom. So, m varies from row to row, and Equation (7) becomes:  
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Replacing the theoretical ijp~  in the denominator of the test statistic in Equation (9) by 
the empirical ijpˆ  as suggested in Anderson and Goodman (1957), and marking with an * the 
coordinates of the transition probability for which we would like to construct the confidence 
interval, Equation (8) becomes: 
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Rearranging terms in the expression in order to isolate **~ jip  gives us: 
 
supinf
******
~~~
jijiji ppp ££ ,                                                                                                     (11) 
 
where: 
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Notice that this expression does not actually explicitly define the limits of the 
confidence interval for the unknown true value of the transition probability in question, **~ jip . 
These limits are defined in terms of the unknown true values of the other transition 
probabilities, ijp~ . And so we are faced with a system of å
=
-
m
i
im
1
)1(  simultaneous equations. 
This analytical complexity is due to the multidimensionality of the problem. In trying to 
derive confidence intervals for the individual transition probabilities, we are trying to map out 
a multidimensional confidence region onto its component dimensions.  
 
The analytical complexity of this problem can be overcome by decomposing Equation 
(11) into its individual dimensions. Because the rows of a Markovian transition matrix are 
independent, we can consider the individual rows of the transition matrix separately, and 
Equation (10) reduces to: 
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Because our interest lies with the generic individual transition probability ** jip , we can lump 
together the other transition probabilities in row i* into the term **1 jip- , and Equation (12) 
reduces to:  
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Setting 05.0=a , rearranging terms and simplifying, we get: 
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 Applying Equation (14) to the estimated transition probability matrix in Equation (5), 
we get Equation (15):  
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Notice that the confidence region for the estimated transition matrix is not particularly large. 
We will come back to this point later. Now that we have calculated the confidence intervals 
for the estimated transition probabilities, we would like to project these intervals onto the 
space inhabited by the ergodic distribution. This is the issue to which we now turn. 
 
3.2   Ergodic distribution 
 
 The estimated ergodic distribution is calculated as the left eigenvector corresponding 
to the unit eigenvalue of the estimated transition probability matrix (c.f. Equation 3). One 
might be tempted to apply this same line of reasoning in the calculation of the bounds to the 
confidence region for the ergodic distribution. This would mean calculating the lower bounds 
to the confidence intervals for the elements of the ergodic distribution by using the matrix of 
lower bounds to the confidence intervals for the transition probabilities to calculate the left 
eigenvector corresponding to the unit eigenvalue: infinfinf )()( Pnn ¥=¥ . This is what is done 
in simple interval arithmetic. To add two intervals together, we add up the two lower bounds 
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and add up the two upper bounds: ],[],[],[ dbcadcba ++=+ . To multiply two intervals 
together, we multiply the two lower bounds and multiply the two upper bounds: 
]*,*[],[*],[ dbcadcba = . But taking a closer look at the matrix of lower bounds to the 
confidence intervals for the transition probabilities, one can notice that this matrix could never 
be an estimated probability matrix and therefore cannot be used to calculate an ergodic 
distribution. Indeed the rows do not sum to one, but to less than one, precisely because the 
matrix collects the lower bounds to the confidence intervals for the transition probabilities. 
The equivalent story can be told in terms of the upper bounds.  
 
So, how can we identify the transition matrices within the confidence region that will 
generate the lowest and highest values for the different elements of the ergodic distribution? 
Hartfiel (1998) applies interval arithmetic to Markov chains in what is called the theory of 
Markov set-chains. In this context he presents the Hi-Lo Method, an algorithm to numerically 
calculate the bounds to a compact set of transition matrices at every step in its Markovian 
evolution. Since the rows of a transition matrix converge to the ergodic distribution as the 
Markov chain evolves towards its long-run distribution (c.f. Equation 3), applying the Hi-Lo 
Method until convergence is achieved will provide us with bounds for the ergodic 
distribution.       
 
The Hi-LoMethod proceeds component by component, systematically identifying the 
lowest and highest values possible for each of the transition probabilities at every step in its 
path to convergence. Let us go through this algorithm for one of the transition probabilities. 
Consider the first entry in the transition matrix P  at time t , )(11 tp . One period goes by, t  
becomes 1+t , and P  beomes 2P . The first entry in the transition matrix at time 1+t  is 
obtained via matrix multiplication of the first column of P  and the first row of P . This can 
be thought of as calculating the average of the column elements, weighted by the row 
elements. We would like to identify the smallest value that )1(11 +tp  can possibly take. Our 
starting point is )(inf11 tp , the first entry in the matrix of lower bounds 
infP  at time t  that is 
calculated using Equation (14). The first entry in the matrix of lower bounds at time 1+t  is 
obtained via matrix multiplication of a column and a row. How to construct this column and 
this row? We want the smallest numbers possible subject to the constraint that the row must 
sum to one. Since there are no constraints concerning the column, we take the column 
containing the smallest values possible, i.e. the first column of  infP . As for the row, it needs 
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to sum to one, which means that we cannot use the first row of infP . The smaller some of the 
elements of the row are chosen to be, the bigger the other elements of the row are going to 
have to be. So we construct a row using the smallest elements from infP  and the biggest 
elements from supP , leaving one element to be calculated so that the row sums to one. These 
elements are arranged so as to minimize the weighted sum of the column. This means that the 
biggest elements of the row are positioned to weight the smallest elements of the column, 
leaving the smallest elements of the row to weight the biggest elements of the column. The 
same approach can be taken to calculate )1(sup11 +tp , the biggest value that )1(11 +tp  can 
possibly take. This methodology can then be applied to each of the transition probabilities at 
each time period until the rows of the transition matrix converge to the ergodic distribution. 
This will provide us with the bounds to the confidence intervals for each of the elements of 
the ergodic distribution.    
 
 Applying the Hi-Lo Method to the matrices of upper and lower bounds presented in 
(14), we get:  
 
[ ] [ ]{ }932.0443.0464.0449.0710.0,003.0010.0009.0004.0005.0)(ˆ Î¥n .   (16) 
 
Notice that the confidence region for the estimated twin-peaked distribution is inhabited by 
distributions of all shapes. For example, within this confidence region we find the uniform 
distribution [ ]20.020.020.020.020.0 , the unimodal distribution 
[ ]10.020.040.020.010.0 , and the trimodal distribution 
[ ]25.010.030.015.020.0 . Coming back to the question posed at the beginning of this 
section, we can now answer that the twin-peaked result is not robust.    
 
It is important to point out that the nonrobustness of the twin peaks result does not 
originate in the particularly large size of the confidence region for the estimated transition 
probability matrix (c.f. Equation 15), but rather in the extreme sensitivity of the ergodic 
distribution to perturbations to the estimated transition matrix. This extreme sensitivity was 
first noted by Reichlin (1999) in her discussion of Quah (1999). To illustrate this point, 
consider the following three examples in which the estimated transition matrix is only 
marginally perturbed and yet the corresponding ergodic distribution is significantly perturbed. 
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Increasing 23pˆ  by 1%, causes the ergodic distribution to become trimodal: 
[ ]25.014.020.016.025.0 . Increasing 45pˆ  by 2%, shifts the mass in the ergodic 
distribution from the four left classes to the right peak: [ ]37.010.014.015.024.0 . 
Increasing 54pˆ  by 1%, causes the ergodic distribution to become unimodal in state 1: 
[ ]12.014.019.021.034.0 . 
 
In the next section, the economic notion of elasticity is used to develop a measure of 
the fragility of the ergodic distribution in view of defining the empirical limitations of the 
simple Markov chain model. 
 
4.   Elasticity 
 
In this section, the fragility of the ergodic distribution to perturbations to the estimated 
transition probability matrix is examined in analytical terms. The idea is to express the 
elements of the ergodic distribution as a function of the transition probabilities in order to 
calculate the elasticities of the former with respect to the latter. These elasticities then serve to 
describe certain characteristics of the ergodic function that is being fitted to the data and to 
explain the results presented in the previous section. 
 
4.1   Ergodic function 
 
 In the application of Markov chain theory to the evolution of income distribution over 
time, the estimated transition probability matrix presents the following tri-diagonal structure:  
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and 0,,,,,,,,,,,, >onmlkjhgfdcba . As usual, the ergodic distribution presents the 
following structure: zyxwvn =¥)(  where 1=++++ zyxwv  and 0,,,, ³zyxwv . 
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To express zyxwv ,,,,  as a function of onmlkjhgfdcba ,,,,,,,,,,,, , the system of equations 
defining the ergodic distribution (i.e. Pnn ×¥=¥ )()( ) needs to be solved.  
 
The following intermediate result is obtained: 
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This result is interesting because it shows that the magnitude of any one element of the 
ergodic distribution relative to that of its right hand side neighbor is determined by the ratio of 
the probability of entry into, and the probability of exit from, the neighboring state. For 
example, if the probability of entering state 1 from state 2 (i.e. c) is double the probability of 
leaving state 1 to state 2 (i.e. b), then in the long run, the mass in state 1 (i.e. v) will be double 
the mass in state 2 (i.e. w). In other words, just by calculating the four ratios of off-diagonal 
elements, it is possible to establish the shape of the ergodic distribution. 
 
 Completely solving the system, the following result is obtained: 
 
ååååå
=
ZYXWVzyxwv                                   (19) 
 
where nkgcV = , nkgbW = , nkfbX = , njfbY = , mjfbZ =  and ZYXWV ++++=å . This 
result has a surprisingly simple interpretation. The portion of the population in any one state 
in the long run is just the product of the probabilities of transiting towards that state divided 
by the sum of the five possible products. For example, the portion of the population in state 1 
in the long run (i.e. v) is the product of the probabilities of transiting from 5 to 4 (i.e. n), from 
4 to 3 (i.e. k), from 3 to 2 (i.e. g), and from 2 to 1 (i.e. c) divided by the sum of the products of 
the probabilities of transiting towards 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Note the absence of the 
diagonal elements of the transition probability matrix from the function defining the elements 
of the ergodic distribution. This means that the ergodic distribution depends only upon 
observations of mobility and not upon observations of immobility.  
 
 Before using the ergodic function to calculate the elasticities of the elements of the 
ergodic distribution with respect to the transition probabilities, it is useful to explicitly state 
Part I. Chapter 1. On the Robustness of the Twin-peaked Ergodic Distribution of Income across Countries 
22 
the conditions under which the transition matrix generates a twin-peaked ergodic distribution. 
For two modes located in classes 1 and 5, the following two conditions are necessary: 
bcwv >«>  and nmyz >«> . In other words, the probability of entering the state in 
which the mode is located must be superior to the the probability of leaving this state. To 
ensure that these two modes are the only two modes (i.e. that there is no mode located in state 
3), either one or both of the following two conditions is necessary: gfwx £«£  and/or 
jkyx £«£ . In other words, the probabilities of entering state 3 cannot simultaneously be 
superior to the probabilities of leaving state 3. Combining this interpretation of the off-
diagonal elements with the interpretation of the ratios of the off-diagonal elements, it is 
possible just by looking at the transition matrix to determine the existence and relative 
magnitude of twin peaks in the ergodic distribution. 
 
4.2   Elasticity 
 
Now let us calculate the elasiticities of the elements of the ergodic distribution with 
respect to the transition probabilities. Since all the elements concerned are probabilities, this 
elasticity is just the slope of the ergodic function of interest. Since each element of the ergodic 
distribution is a function of the eight off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix, and since 
the ergodic distribution is made up of five elements, there are 40 elasticities to calculate for 
each ergodic distribution. The general expressions for these 40 elasticities are presented in the 
Figure 8, and the values taken by these expressions in each of the five cases considered are 
presented in Figure 9. These elasticities reveal two interesting characteristics of the ergodic 
function. 
 
First, the elasticities of the elements of the ergodic distribution with respect to the 
transition probabilities tend to increase as the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix 
decrease. For example, a marginal perturbation (+/- 1%) to c  when 
03.0======== nmkjgfcb  can either create a peak or a trough in the poorest class of 
the long run income distribution (i.e. [ ]19.019.019.019.025.0)( =¥n  or 
[ ]21.021.021.021.014.0)( =¥n ), whereas the same marginal perturbation to c  when 
33.0======== nmkjgfcb  barely affects the uniformity of the poorer classes of the 
long run income distribution (i.e. [ ]199.0199.0199.0199.0205.0)( =¥n  or 
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[ ]201.0201.0201.0201.0195.0)( =¥n ). Equation (18) is useful in understanding why 
this happens to be the case. When the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix are small, 
a small absolute difference (e.g. 04.001.005.0 =-=- bc ) can be compatible with a large 
relative difference (e.g. 501.0/05.0/ ==bc ), whereas when these elements are larger, the 
same absolute difference (e.g. 04.031.035.0 =-=- bc ) corresponds to a smaller relative 
difference (e.g. 13.131.0/35.0/ ==bc ). Since it is the relative differences that determine the 
shape of the ergodic distribution, the smaller the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix 
are, the more sensitive the shape is to marginal perturbations to these off-diagonal elements.  
 
Second, the elasticities of v and z with respect to the transition probabilities are higher 
than the elasticities of w, x and y with respect to the transition probabilities. Intuitively, the 
relatively high elasticity of the endpoints of the ergodic distribution can be explained by the 
fact that whereas the three middle states all have two exits (i.e. one to a lower state and one to 
a higher state), the two endpoints only have one exit. So, whereas blocking one of these single 
exits necessarily leads to a pile up in one of the endpoints in the long run, blocking one of the 
other exits leads to a pile up that could potentially be distributed amongst all the states behind 
the blocked exit via the unblocked exit. Another way of thinking about this idea is by 
counting the number of constraints on the elements of the transition probability matrix 
required to generate a mode in the different states of the ergodic distribution. The generation 
of a mode in a particular state requires that the entry probabilities be superior to the exit 
probabilities. Since the states 1 and 5 only have one point of entry and of exit, only one 
condition needs to be fulfilled to ensure a mode in one of these states in the long run (i.e. 
bc >  for a mode in state 1 and nm >  for a mode in state 5). States 2, 3 and 4, on the other 
hand, each have two points of entry and of exit and therefore two conditions need to be 
fulfilled to ensure a mode in one of these states in the long run (i.e. cb >  and fg >  for a 
mode in state 2, gf >  and jk >  for a mode in state 3, and kj >  and mn >  for a mode in 
state 4). In sum, with such a functional form, it is easier to generate a mode in states 1 and 5 
than in any of the other states, especially if the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix 
are particularly small. 
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4.3   Application 
 
Finally, we examine the insights provided by these two observations concerning the 
ergodic function into the results presented in Section 3. Looking at the ergodic distribution 
calculated from the unfiltered data (see Equation 6), we observe that sizeable twin peaks are 
present, and we recall that these twin peaks are not statistically significant. Why? As for the 
existence of the twin peaks, the conditions for modes located in states 1 and 5 of the ergodic 
distribution are fulfilled (i.e. 0396.00594.0 =>= bc  and 0103.00173.0 =>= nm ), and the 
conditions for modes located in states 2, 3 or 4 are not fulfilled. As for the magnitudes of the 
twin peaks, the 5.1/ =bc  and 7.1/ =nm  ratios are relatively high. Note that 5.1/ =bc  even 
though 0198.0=- bc , and that 7.1/ =nm  even though 0070.0=- nm . In other words, the 
sizeable twin peaks result from minute differences between the related off-diagonal transition 
probabilities. 
 
 As for the lack of statistical significance of the twin peaks, the off-diagonal elements 
of the transition matrix are relatively small, the elasticities of the elements of the ergodic 
distribution are relatively high, and the ergodic distribution is relatively sensitive to variations 
in the elements of the transition matrix. In particular, the mode in state 1 of the ergodic 
distribution exists because 0396.00594.0 =>= bc . Relative to the uniform distribution, this 
difference between c and b represents either 11 observations too few out of the 555 
observations made in state 1, or 11 observations too many out of the 556 observations made 
in state 2. The case surrounding the mode in state 5 is even more impressive. The mode in 
state 5 of the ergodic distribution exists because 0103.00173.0 =>= nm . Relative to the 
uniform distribution, this difference between m and n represents either 1 observation too few 
out of the 347 observations made in state 4, or 1 observation too many out of the 487 
observations made in state 5. For the mode in state 5 to be significant, no error could be 
tolerated and the confidence region would have to be a point. 
 
 Comparing the results from the estimation with no filter to the results from the 
estimations with increasingly fine filters, the observations made above become all the more 
true. Indeed, the filters render the transition matrices less and less mobile by definition, thus 
progressively reducing the already small off-diagonal elements of the transition matrix and 
progressively increasing the already large elasticities of the elements of the ergodic 
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distribution relative to the off-diagonal elements of the transition matrices. This extreme 
fragility of the elements of these ergodic distributions to variations in the transition 
probabilities is illustrated by the impact of the third filter on the ergodic distribution (see 
Equation 6). This filter discards three of the observed transitions into state 1 and two of the 
observed transitions out of state 1 and in consequence the mode in state 1 of the ergodic 
distribution rises from around 40% to around 50%. 
 
 Observing the evolution of the results as increasingly fine filters are applied, we see a 
rapid degeneration of the irreducible Markov chain model into an absorbing Markov chain 
model. The results of the fourth filter indicate that of the 487 observations in state 5, only 2 
constitute transitions, and that of the 555 observations in state 1, only 6 constitute transitions 
(see Figure 7). Thus it would not be very farfetched to fit the data with a model treating states 
1 and 5 as absorbing states. In a model with two absorbing states, all observations end up in 
one of the two states (i.e. twin peaks), and the distribution between these two states depends 
not only upon the transition probabilities in the transient class, but also upon the initial 
distribution of the observations. Calculating this long run distribution between the two states, 
we obtain that if the underlying processes were to continue in the long run, 66% of the 
countries would end up very poor and 34% very rich. 
 
In sum, not only does the application of the simple Markov chain model to data on 
income distribution impose a very particular functional form to the long run distribution of the 
data, but the data is also such that it situates the analysis in the most fragile region of this very 
particular functional form, in a region where the irreducible Markov chain model is rapidly 
degenerating into an absorbing Markov chain model. 
 
5.   Concluding remarks 
 
This paper makes two contributions to the existing literature on empirical applications 
of the simple Markov chain model. First, confidence intervals for the transition probabilities 
are analytically derived and confidence intervals for the ergodic probabilities are numerically 
calculated. These are the basic elements of statistical inference that should constitute an 
integral part of any empirical analysis. Second, the notion of the elasticity of the ergodic 
probabilities with respect to the transition probabilities is developed and quantified. This is a 
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tool that researchers can use to assess whether or not the simple Markov chain model should 
be used to model their data. 
 
Two lessons emerge from this paper. First, when Markov chain models are fitted to 
continuous data, a bias towards excess mobility is introduced into the estimated transition 
matrix. Second, when the estimated transition matrix of a simple Markov chain model 
presents a certain type of high immobility, the corresponding ergodic distribution is 
characterized by an extreme fragility of a very particular sort. 
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Figure 3: Business cycle type fluctuations about the frontier between states 1 and 2 
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Figure 4: Business cycle type fluctuations about the frontier between states 2 and 3 
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Figure 5: Business cycle type fluctuations about the frontier between states 3 and 4 
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Figure 6: Business cycle type fluctuations about the frontier between states 4 and 5 
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Figure 7: Observed transition matrices 
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Figure 8: General expressions for the elasticities of the elements of the ergodic 
distribution with respect to the transition probabilities 
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Figure 9: Elasticities of the elements of the ergodic distribution with respect to the 
transition probabilities 
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Chapter 2 
Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate 
 
Abstract: The simplicity with which short-run dynamics are translated into long-run 
tendencies in the simple Markov chain model has lured social scientists into applying this 
discrete model to continuous data. In the context of the cross-country convergence debate, 
this application leads to biased estimates of the short-run dynamics (i.e. transition probability 
matrix) and non-robust estimates of the long-run tendencies (i.e. ergodic distribution); the 
model chosen specifically because of the insights provided into mobility, no longer supplies 
robust results on mobility. This chapter examines the causes underlying this breakdown of the 
simple Markov chain model and proposes a simple solution that uses notions imported from 
the domain of fuzzy logic to adapt the simple Markov chain model to continuous data.  
 
Keywords: Convergence; Filters; Fuzzy logic; Income distribution; Markov chains; Twin 
peaks. 
 
JEL classification: C49; F02.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
The simple Markov chain model3 has been widely used in the social sciences to study 
the phenomenon of mobility. In the early days of this literature, empirical applications were 
mainly limited to different aspects of social mobility (Rogoff 1953; Glass and Hall 1954; 
Blumen, Kogan and McCarthy 1955; Prais 1955; McFarland 1970; Singer and Spilerman 
1974; Shorrocks 1976; Lee, Judge and Zellner 1977). Exceptions include Anderson (1954) 
who studies changes in voter attitude during the 1940 American presidential elections, 
Adelman (1958) who studies the size distribution of firms and Telser (1962) who studies the 
choice of cigarette brands. Quah (1993a, 1993b, 1996a) revives economists’ interest in the 
simple Markov chain model with his application of distribution dynamics to the cross-country 
income convergence issue. Examples from the branch in the literature inspired by Quah’s 
research include Villaverde and Sanchez-Robles (2001) in their study of the Spanish regional 
dynamics of per capita income, Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2004) in their study of the shape of the 
growth process for a cross-section of countries in the European Union and in the world, and 
Proudman, Redding and Bianchi (1998) in their study of the relationship between 
international openness in trade and economic growth. Recently, applications of the simple 
Markov chain model have been carried out in domains as diverse as agricultural economics 
(Temel and Alberson (2000) study the evolutions of the size and productivity distributions of 
farms in the US; Temel and Alberson (2001) study convergence in hired farm wages in 
United States counties), environmental economics (Skaggs and Ghosh (1999) study the 
changes in wind-based soil erosion rates over time), labor economics (Buchinsky and Hunt 
(1996) study wage mobility in the United States; Constant and Zimmerman (2003) study the 
dynamics of repeat migration in Germany), and even the economics of sports (Koop (2001) 
studies mobility across the performance distribution in American Major League Baseball). 
.    
The prime attraction in this Markovian approach lies in the simplicity with which 
short-run dynamics are characterized and long-run tendencies calculated.4 In the previous 
chapter, I discussed the potential fragility of the estimated ergodic distribution (c.f. long-run 
tendencies), and I used the cross-country income convergence application to illustrate the 
                                                 
3 The term simple Markov chain model refers to the representation of data via a first-order, discrete time, discrete 
state-space Markovian process. 
4 In the simple Markov chain model, the transition probability matrix summarizes the information on short-run 
dynamics and the ergodic distribution summarizes the information on long-run tendencies. 
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discussion. In this chapter, I will discuss the potential biasedness of the estimated transition 
matrix (c.f. short-run dynamics), and I will continue to use the same application to illustrate 
the discussion.  
 
Quah uses the simple Markov chain model to paint a new picture of the world in 
which the rich and the poor are diverging to form ‘twin peaks’. In Chapter 1, I contest the 
robustness of this conclusion, questioning the suitability of this model to analyse the cross-
country convergence issue. More specifically, I show that the ergodic distribution is so 
exceedingly sensitive to marginal perturbations to the estimated transition probability matrix 
that all sorts of different shaped ergodic distributions are compatible with the transition 
probability matrices inhabiting the confidence region of the estimated transition probability 
matrix. In this chapter, I complete my critique of the application of the simple Markov chain 
model to the cross-country convergence issue.  More specifically, I demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the estimated transition probability matrix in providing accurate information on 
short-run dynamics. So, in the context of the cross-country convergence issue, the simple 
Markov chain model provides a biased characterisation of the short-run dynamics and a 
fragile representation of the long-run tendencies. Other related problems with this Markovian 
approach have also been raised in the literature (Aghevli and Mehran 1981; Davies and 
Shorrocks 1989; Mattsson and Thorburn 1989; Fingleton 1997; Magrini 1999; Reichlin 1999; 
Landon-Lane and Quinn 2000; Bulli 2001; Kremer, Onatski and Stock 2001; Pearlman 2003), 
but efforts to resolve these problems have been piecemeal, and as such, unsatisfactory (for an 
exception, see Rummel 2005). In my view, this riddle has not yet been resolved because the 
problem has not been properly defined. 
 
 As most econometric modelling problems, this problem has two separate parts: model 
specification and model identification. If the specification is wrong, the identification is 
meaningless. In the literature on the cross-country income convergence issue, model 
specification is simply assumed away, and research is focused on the identification issue. But 
it is a well known and often acknowledged fact that it is wrong to just assume that the Markov 
property holds for a given time series of observations. This oversight is crucial because it 
leads to mistakes in the evaluation of the model identification. In the literature, the quality of 
the discrete Markov model is evaluated by comparing it with the continuous Markov model, 
but if the time discretization of the underlying continuous process that is arbitrarily imposed 
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by the annual deadlines of national statistical offices is not Markovian, then the discrete and 
the continuous representations of the space dimension of the process are both wrong.  
 
Even if I abstract away from this problem of model specification and focus on the 
model identification aspect of the cross-country convergence issue, I find that the approach 
taken in the literature is surprisingly unsatisfactory. Indeed, in this context space-
discretization is just non-parametric estimation of a two-dimensional density, and yet the 
space-discretization carried out in the literature ignores even the simplest of the 
recommendations made in the vast literature on density estimation.  
 
In this chapter, I propose an improvement upon past practice of space-discretization, 
one which resolves the problem of the fragility of the estimated ergodic distribution. This 
improvement presents the additional advantage of also resolving the yet to be defined 
problem of the biasedness of the estimation transition probability matrix. 
 
In the application of the simple Markov chain model to panel data on income, the 
estimated transition probability matrix is used to extract information concerning the mobility 
of countries within the distribution of incomes from the dataset. This information is 
camouflaged by two sources of noise. In theory, the long-run distribution is independent of 
short-run noise; in practice, however, this is no longer the case because the sample is finite. 
Moreover, because of the exceedingly high sensitivity of the ergodic distribution to marginal 
perturbations to the estimated transition probability matrix, the short-run noise does not even 
have to be sizeable to significantly contaminate the long-run distribution. 
 
The first source of noise results from using continuous data to estimate a categorical 
model (i.e. from translating continuous data into discrete data by defining income class 
frontiers). In the simple Markov chain model, transitions represent mobility; in reality, 
however, transitions can occur for two reasons. Transitions can result from higher or lower 
than average world growth in a country. In Figure 1, country A’s growth process propels it 
through the cross-country income distribution in an upward manner, while country B’s 
business cycle steers it through the cross-country income distribution in a cyclical fashion. 
This is what we call mobility and this is what we would like to measure. Transitions can also 
result from marginal fluctuations in a country's relative income when the level of relative 
income is situated very close to one defining a frontier between classes. In Figure 1, country 
Part I. Chapter 2. Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate. 
37 
C follows a surprisingly stable path through the cross-country income distribution. This is 
clearly not mobility and since such transitions are included in the calculation of mobility, it is 
necessary to correct the estimated transition probability matrix for this bias. 
 
Figure 1: Transitions resulting from growth (A), business cycles (B), and marginal 
fluctuations (C) 
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The second source of noise is generated by inaccuracies in the data. Two aspects of 
these inaccuracies are of particular interest. First, data inaccuracy exists. A given fluctuation 
in the context of a constantly-evolving series on estimates of income should not necessarily be 
treated in the same manner as the same fluctuation in the context of an upwardly-evolving 
series of estimates on income. A distinction needs to be made between short-run dynamics 
and short-run noise. Second, there are huge differentials in data inaccuracy. Heston, Summers 
and Aten (2006) and Summers and Heston (1984, 1991, 1994, 2002) include quality grades 
for the data provided in the Penn World Tables. A series of badly-graded estimates of income 
should not be treated in the same manner as a series of well-graded estimates of income. A 
distinction needs to be made between good-quality data and bad-quality data. The robustness 
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of the results provided by the simple Markov chain model significantly increases when these 
three considerations are taken into account. 
 
 In sum, the simplicity with which short-run dynamics are translated into long-run 
tendencies in the simple Markov chain model has convinced researchers to force this 
categorical model onto continuous data, and paradoxically enough, this forcing (enhanced by 
the data inaccuracy issue) biases estimates of the short-run dynamics and fragilizes estimates 
of the long-run tendencies. In other words, the model chosen specifically because of the 
insights provided into mobility, no longer supplies robust results on mobility. The obvious 
solution to this problem is to use a continuous framework when working with continuous 
data, as with the non-parametric techniques applied by Quah (1996a, 1997), Bianchi (1997) 
and Johnson (2000). Another solution is to perform a rigorous discretization of the continuous 
data before applying the categorical model, as with the regenerative sampling carried out by 
Bulli (2001). These solutions, although valid, compromise the simplicity initially attracting 
researchers to the simple Markov chain model. This chapter provides such a simple solution, 
using notions imported from the domain of fuzzy logic to adapt the simple Markov chain 
model to continuous data.5 
 
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the cross-country 
income convergence issue is redefined in order to highlight its two main features, time-
discretization and space-discretization. Discrete and continuous space-discretization are 
discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Time discretization is dealt with in Section 
2.3. Section 3 illustrates the problem posed by the application of the simple Markov chain 
model to panel data on income, focusing on the bias present in the estimate of the short-run 
dynamics. In the Section 3.1, the consequences of the arbitrary discretization of the 
continuous data for the estimated transition probability matrix are analyzed. In Section 3.2, 
the implications of the two types of data inaccuracy for the estimate of the transition 
probability matrix are examined. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to presenting a simple solution 
permitting the application of the simple Markov chain model to continuous data. In Section 4, 
fuzzification of the income class frontiers and of the income observations is carried out. In 
Section 5, a selective filter is applied to the data, eliminating the short-run noise while 
                                                 
5 This solution has nothing to do with fuzzy Markov chains (Avrachenkov and Sanchez 2002). 
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retaining the short-run dynamics. Section 6 presents the empirical results and Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2.  Redefinition of the cross-country income convergence issue  
 
 Countries follow different paths over time through the distribution of income across 
countries. These continuous space and time processes of income mobility are observed at 
discrete points in time Tt ,...,2,,0 tt=  when they take values belonging to the continuous 
space of relative incomes S. The data used is the Laspeyres index of annual real per capita 
income from the Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) Penn World Tables version 6.2 for the 98 
countries with data available for the 1960-03 time period.6 The variable used to evaluate 
mobility is relative income (i.e. country income normalized with respect to the arithmetic 
mean of world income). These observations can be plotted on a plane representing income 
mobility as shown in Figure 2. Contrary to the typical representation of such data, relative 
income at time t ( Sy Î ) is represented on the y-axis and relative income at time t+t  ( Sx Î ) 
on the x-axis. The axes have been inverted in order to graphically construct a transition 
probability matrix/kernel. Note the minimal variance of the observations about the diagonal 
and the varying density of the observations along the diagonal. The whole debate surrounding 
the application of the simple Markov chain model to panel data on income is how to properly 
extract the long-run distribution from this process that is characterized by these two very 
particular properties. This extraction requires the estimation of a transition probability 
matrix/kernel and so the problem of extracting the long-run distribution is translated into the 
problem of estimating the transition probability matrix/kernel corresponding to the income 
mobility process. In this section, a better understanding of the different approaches taken in 
solving this estimation problem, and the corresponding difficulties encountered, is achieved 
                                                 
6 The 98 countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, 
Republic of, Costa Rica, Cote d`Ivoire, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Honduras, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea, Republic of, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad &Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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by placing them in the context of Silverman’s (1986) classic survey of non-parametric density 
estimation techniques. 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of cross-county income mobility 
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 In the Markov literature on cross-country convergence, the scatterplot of the 
observations is implicitly assumed to be a realization of the ‘true’ Markovian transition 
operator; consequently, the transition probability matrix/kernel estimation problem is 
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implicitly treated as a standard non-parametric density estimation problem (Quah 1996b & 
1997, Desdoigts 1996, Johnson 2000, Bulli 2001). In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the discrete and 
continuous approaches to the estimation problem are explicitly presented as Silverman’s 
histogram and kernel estimators. The treatment of the observations as a realization of the 
‘true’ Markovian transition operator overlooks the widely cited fact that a Markov process 
retains the Markov property only for certain space and time discretizations (Kemeny and 
Snell 1960), and the empirical reality that whereas the observations take values belonging to 
the continuous space of relative incomes, they are collected only at discrete points in time. 
Therefore, in order for the observations to represent a realization of the ‘true’ Markovian 
transition operator, they need to be corrected for the most probably improper time 
discretization imposed by the annual frequency of the data.  
 
Viewing the estimation problem from this new perspective, it appears that the efforts 
in the domain have been misdirected, relatively much attention in the literature having been 
accorded to the problem of space discretization (Aghevli and Mehran 1981, Davies and 
Shorrocks 1989, Magrini 1999, Bulli 2001), and absolutely no attention to the problem of 
time discretization. Indeed, because estimation of the Markovian transition operator is thought 
to be just a question of unwieldly non-parametrics, the number one priority has been to 
recover the simplicity inherent in the discrete approach without compromising the precision 
of the continuous approach (i.e. to develop a rigorous method of space-discretization); taking 
the implications of annually observed data into account, it appears that one step has been 
skipped in the race to simplicity and that the number one priority should be to extract a 
realization of the ‘true’ Markovian transition operator from the observations (i.e. to develop a 
rigorous method of time-discretization). In Section 2.3, Bulli’s (2001) paper on regenerative 
discretization is reinterpreted to provide the required correction of the observations and thus 
generate a realization of the ‘true’ Markovian transition operator. Once this realization has 
been identified, estimation of the transition matrix/kernel and calculation of the corresponding 
ergodic distribution proves to be a very straightforward process.  
 
2.1   Discrete approach to space discretization: the histogram estimator  
 
The simplest and most popular solution to the transition operator estimation problem 
is maximum likelihood (ML) estimation of the transition probability matrix. There are a small 
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number of states i  ),...,1,( iji =  and transitions between these states are observed at regular 
intervals t  for a finite length of time T. Let )( t+tN  be the ii ´  matrix of transitions 
observed at time t+t , where the ij-th element )()( ixjyNtn tij ===+ +tt  represents the 
number of transitions from state i to state j observed at time t+t . Summing over the columns 
of the matrix of transitions observed at time t+t  provides the distribution of observations 
across the states at time t, denoted )(tn  where the i-th element å = +=
i
j iji
tntn
1
)()( t  
represents the number of observations in state i at time t. Summing over the rows of the 
matrix of transitions observed at time t+t  provides the distribution of observations across 
the states at time t+t , denoted )( t+tn  where the j-th element å = +=+
i
i ijj
tntn
1
)()( tt  
represents the number of observations in state j at time t+t . Summing over the rows and 
columns of the matrices of transitions observed during each of the time periods provides the 
total number of observed transitions å å å= = ==
i
i
i
j
T
t ij
tnn
1 1
)(
t
. Suppose that the observed 
transitions are generated by a time-homogenous Markov chain of order one according to the 
matrix of transition probabilities P, where the ij-th element )( ixjyPpij ===  represents the 
probability of transiting from state i to state j. Maximization of the log-likelihood function 
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yields the ML estimator of P, denoted Pˆ , where the ij-th element is  
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The model can be summarized by the following expression of the Markov property: 
Ptntn ×=+ )()( t . The ergodic distribution is then Pnn ×¥=¥ )()( . 
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Five possible states are defined by discretizing the set of possible values of relative 
incomes into intervals at 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, and 2.0 (c.f. Section 3). The estimated transition matrix 
and the corresponding ergodic distribution are:  
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As in Quah (1993a, 1993b, 1996a), the estimated ergodic distribution indicates an evolution 
towards a bipolar world of haves and have-nots.7 
 
Let’s take a closer look at the ML estimate of row i of the transition probability 
matrix: ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
=
i
ii
i
i
i n
n
n
np ...1 .  This is nothing other than the histogram of observations made 
in state i, where class length (i.e. bin width) is normalized to one. Indeed, Equation 2 can be 
rewritten in a format similar to that used by Silverman (1986) on page 9 to define the 
histogram: )(
1
1)(ˆ ij
i
iji nn
xp
×
= . Thus, the ML estimate of the transition matrix can be 
viewed as a stack of i  such histograms. In view of comparing the different approaches to 
estimation of the transition matrix/kernel, it is useful to have an even more graphical 
understanding of what the discrete approach looks like. The ML estimate of the transition 
matrix can be obtained by superimposing a coarse (i.e. ii ´ ) grid upon the scatterplot of the 
observations (c.f. Figure 3), counting up the cell contents and putting them into relation with 
the row sums (c.f. Equation 3).     
 
                                                 
7 The differences between the results presented in Quah (1993a, 1993b, 1996a) and those presented here are due 
to various factors. First, the data comes from a more recent version of the Penn World Tables, is composed of 
somewhat different countries, and is defined for a longer time period. Second, the discretization of the 
continuum of relative incomes needed to be marginally adjusted (c.f. Section 3).  
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Figure 3: Discrete Markov chain model approximation of cross-country income mobility 
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 As established in Chapter 1, the ergodic distribution generated by the discrete estimate 
of the transition probability matrix proves to be so sensitive to marginal perturbations to the 
transition probabilities that a reasonably small confidence region for the estimated transition 
matrix generates an unreasonably large confidence region for the ergodic distribution (c.f. 
Equation 4).  
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This extreme non-robustness of the estimated ergodic distribution renders this basic version of 
the discrete approach non-practicable. The only possibility of salvaging this simple approach 
lies in improving the precision of the discrete estimate of the transition matrix. 
 
 In view of improving upon the ML estimator of the transition probability matrix, let us 
take another look at Figure 3. If we look at the stack of histograms through Markovian lenses, 
the following gross inadequacy becomes evident. True immobility is represented by the line 
tracing the diagonal of the superimposed grid, and mobility increases with the distance from 
this diagonal line. Thus, in Figure 3, observation B represents more mobility than observation 
A represents, and yet this basic characteristic is not captured by the estimated model. 
Estimated immobility is represented by the transition probabilities located on the main 
diagonal of the transition matrix, but in Figure 3 mobile observation B falls into a main 
diagonal cell while immobile observation A falls into an off-diagonal cell. Two simple 
corrections to the estimation procedure outlined above help improve the correspondence 
achieved between true and estimated mobility. The most obvious correction would be to 
refine the grid superimposed upon the data plot. The other correction would be to ‘nudge’ the 
mobile observations that are trapped in off-diagonal cells just over the frontier into main 
diagonal cells. This ‘nudging’ can be achieved by filtering the time series of short-run noise 
(i.e. by requiring a transition to last a minimum number of periods for it to be included in the 
off-diagonal cell count, as in Chapter 1), or by smoothing the data over the time dimension 
(i.e. by replacing the time series by their moving medians, as in Section 5 of this chapter). 
Although these corrections improve the correspondence achieved between estimated and true 
mobility, by decreasing the off-diagonal cell counts, they actually exacerbate the problem of 
non-robustness of the estimated ergodic distribution. 
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 If we now look at Figure 3 through non-parametric lenses, Silverman (1986) can be 
used to identify other inadequacies with the discrete approach to the transition operator 
estimation problem. The use of the histogram to accurately represent data is limited by the 
necessary choice of bin origin and bin width. This dependency of the estimate of the transition 
probability matrix upon class definition introduces just the sort of uncertainty in the accuracy 
of the discrete estimate that needs to be minimized in order to limit the confidence region of 
the ergodic distribution.  The use of the more sophisticated non-parametric estimator, the 
kernel estimator, by centering bins upon the datapoints themselves, constitutes a well-known 
improvement upon the histogram.   
 
2.2   Continuous approach to space discretization: the kernel estimator 
 
The generally accepted solution to the transition operator estimation problem is non-
parametric estimation of the transition probability kernel. There are an infinite number of 
states ( Slk Î, ), and transitions between these states are observed at regular intervals t  for a 
finite length of time T. Let ),( yxN t t+  be the joint density of transitions observed at time 
t+t , and let ò
¥
=
0
),()( dyyxNxnt  and ò
¥
+ = 0 ),()( dxyxNynt t  be the distributions of 
observations across the states at times t and t+t  respectively (i.e. current and future marginal 
densities respectively). Normalizing the joint density with respect to the current marginal 
density provides the conditional density of transitions observed at time t+t , denoted 
)( xyN t t+ . Suppose that the observed transitions are generated by a time-homogenous 
Markov process of order one according to the kernel of transition probabilities P. Non-
parametric estimation of the conditional density of observed transitions yields the following 
bivariate kernel density estimator: 
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where 6/122 *)ˆˆ(*2.1 -+= nh yx ss  is the rule-of –thumb window width, 
2ˆ xs  and 
2ˆ ys  are the 
estimated variances of x and y respectively, and K is the bivariate Epanechnikov kernel: 
 
Part I. Chapter 2. Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate. 
47 
{ }
ïî
ï
í
ì <-+-----
=
otherwise
hyyxxifyyxxh
hK iiii
0
)()()()(2 2222222p .       (6) 
 
The model can be summarized by the following expression of the Markov property: 
ò
¥
+ = 0 )()()( dxxnxyPyn tt t . The ergodic distribution is then ò
¥
¥¥ = 0 )()()( dxxnxyPyn . 
 
 Let’s take a closer look at the non-parametric estimation of the transition probability 
kernel in action. Whereas the theoretical definition of the discrete version of the Markov 
model is directly applicable, practical difficulties with the analytical evaluation of the 
continuous version of the Markov model oblige the researcher to proceed in a numerical 
fashion. This means evaluating the bivariate kernel density estimator at the coordinates of a 
very fine grid and then applying the discrete approach to this bigger and better matrix of 
observed transitions. Viewed in this light, a very concrete understanding of the improvements 
embodied in the continuous application of the Markov model is easy to attain. The first 
improvement is the use of the kernel function to smooth the observed transitions over the 
space dimension. The second improvement is the use of a large number of states to simulate 
continuity as best as possible. Both of these improvements correct for the poor 
correspondence between estimated and true mobility that is unavoidable in the discrete 
application of the Markov model. More technically, the numerical evaluation of the 
continuous estimate of the transition operator converges to the discrete estimate of the 
transition operator as the window width of the smoothing function converges to a point and as 
the gridunit used in the numerical evaluation of the continuous approach converges to the 
class width used in the discrete approach. More graphically, the observations are once again 
plotted upon the plane of income mobility, but this time the observations are represented by 
‘bumps’ and not by points, then a grid is once again superimposed upon the data plot, but this 
time the grid is a very fine one and not a coarse one, and finally cell contents are once again 
counted up and put into relation with row sums (c.f. Figure 4).  
 
Part I. Chapter 2. Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate. 
48 
Figure 4: Continuous Markov chain model approximation of cross-country income 
mobility 
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 If the object is to estimate the density of observed transitions, then the very basic non-
parametric approach outlined above must and easily can be improved upon. It must be 
improved upon because it is not designed to deal with the two characteristics of the mobility 
process noted in the introduction to this section, namely the minimal variance of the data 
about the diagonal and the varying density of the data along the diagonal. Using a constant 
bandwidth in such a situation means that the regions of high data density are oversmoothed 
and the regions of low data density are undersmoothed.  In the controversy over the presence 
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of twin peaks in the ergodic cross-country income distribution, it is essential that there are no 
spurious modes generated by undersmoothing. It can easily be improved upon because in 
Silverman (1986) there is considerable space dedicated to improvements upon the constant 
bandwidth chosen by rule-of-thumb, such as the adaptive kernel chosen by likelihood cross-
validation. The fuzzification of income observations that I develop in Section 4.2 is a variant 
of the approach outlined above. The main difference lies in the fact that the bandwidth in the 
fuzzy approach does not vary with data density as above, but with data quality.  
 
This perspective à la Silverman of the Markovian approach to the cross-country 
convergence debate redefines the whole estimation problem. Two separate issues emerge: 
space-discretization and time-discretization. In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, the time-discretization 
problem has been assumed away (c.f. “Suppose that the observed transitions are generated by 
a time-homogenous Markov process of order one…”), in order to deal with the space-
discretization problem. In Section 2.3, the time-discretization problem will be discussed. 
 
2.3   Regenerative sampling: time and space discretization  
 
To my knowledge, time discretization has only been addressed in Bulli (2001).8 The 
Silverman perspective that I take in this chapter imposes an alternative interpretation of the 
results presented in this paper. She compares three estimates of the ergodic distribution. The 
first estimate (i.e. ‘the discrete limiting distribution obtained from a naïve discretization’) is 
obtained via the simplest discrete analysis, via the superimposition of a coarse grid upon the 
scatterplot of the data (c.f. Figure 3). The second estimate (i.e. ‘the continuous limiting 
distribution’) is obtained via the simplest continuous analysis, via the superimposition of a 
fine grid upon the ‘bump-plot’ of the data in which all bumps are chosen to be identical (c.f. 
Figure 4). The third estimate (i.e. ‘the discrete limiting distribution obtained from a 
regenerative discretization’) is obtained via the superimposition of a coarse grid upon the 
scatterplot of simulated data.  
 
Taking the second estimate to represent the truth, she rejects the first estimate and 
accepts the third estimate. In light of the previous discussion, taking the second estimate as 
                                                 
8 Bulli (2001) presents regenerative sampling as a solution to the space discretization problem. More notably, it 
is also a solution to the time discretization problem. 
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the truth is already problematic (i.e. a constant bandwidth chosen by rule-of-thumb is just too 
crude), but overlooking this detail, other interesting information can be read from these 
results. On one hand, the rejection of the first estimate is not at all surprising; the naïve 
estimator is clearly an inadequate non-parametric estimator and the importance of smoothing 
over the space dimension is thus affirmed.  On the other hand, the acceptance of the third 
estimator is a little more surprising.  
 
What exactly is the difference between the second and third estimators? As already 
mentioned, the second estimate is obtained via the superimposition of a fine grid upon the 
‘bump-plot’ of the data. The data for the third estimate is obtained by using this finely-
gridded bump-plot of the data to generate observations in a Markovian way (more details are 
not pertinent). The third estimate is obtained via the superimposition of a coarse grid upon the 
‘bump-plot’ of the selected data. So, the difference between the two estimates is the 
regenerative discretization, which means that affirming that both methods provide the same 
results, is affirming that the regenerative discretization does not make any difference!  
 
The problem here is not that the regenerative discretization does not make any 
difference, but rather that the second estimator does not represent the truth. What is referred to 
as the transition probability kernel is actually a smoothed representation of the data from 
which the Markovian process still needs to be extracted. This implies defining a state-
discretization AND a time-discretization for which the Markov property holds. Regenerative 
discretization does precisely this, and as such generates the data needed to construct the 
transition probability kernel. 
 
My message can be boiled down to the following two points. First, the cross-country 
income convergence debate has focused on the second step of the problem, the identification 
of the Markov model (space-discretization), before having resolved the first step of the 
problem, the specification of the Markov model (time-discretization). Second, the quality of 
the space-discretization can easily be improved upon by taking into account the 
recommendations made in the classical literature on density estimation. In this chapter, I too 
am guilty of abstracting away from the time-discretization problem. My contribution is to 
improve upon the quality of the space-discretization of the Markov process. As already 
mentioned, my solution addresses not only the issue of fragility of the ergodic distribution, 
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but also the issue of biasedness of the estimated transition probability matrix. This is the issue 
to which we now turn. 
 
3.   Biasedness of the estimated transition probability matrix 
 
 The results from the estimation of the simple Markov chain model are collected in 
Appendix A.1. As these results so strikingly illustrate, the information contained in the 
database, as summarized by the estimated transition probability matrix, is not sufficiently 
precise to generate any meaningful information whatsoever on the long-run tendencies. In 
other words, the sample size is too small to carry out significant statistical inference on the 
ergodic distribution. As shown in Chapter 1, the problem is not the total number of 
observations contained in the database, but rather the grossly unequal distribution of the 
observations amongst the cells of the observed transition matrix. This matrix informs us that 
the twin peaks displayed by the ergodic distribution are actually generated by only 23 of the 
4214 total observations9, that is by less than 1% of all observations. We are facing a problem 
of efficiency. As will be shown in this section, the application of a discrete model to 
continuous data poses another more fundamental problem to the precise estimation of the 
transition probability matrix. 
 
 The precision of the estimated transition probability matrix characterizing a process 
that is supposed to be Markovian is intimately related to the definition of classes. Indeed, a 
process is Markovian if there is one system of classification for which the Markov property 
holds, even if there is no other system of classification for which the Markov property holds 
(Kemeny and Snell, 1960). In other words, if the classes are not defined properly, then the 
model is misspecified.  
 
The process of class definition can be decomposed into the initial division of the state 
space into homogenous groups and the subsequent choice in the level of aggregation. When 
data is discrete, there is a ‘natural’ division of the state space into groups, leaving the 
appropriate level of aggregation to be determined by the researcher only when necessary.10 
                                                 
9 Twin peaks exist when bc > and nm >  simultaneously; hence, the twin peaks here are generated by 
23)610()1635()()( 54451221 =-+-=-+- nnnn  observations (c.f. Section 4.2 in Chapter 1 and Appendix A.1 
in this chapter). 
10 In the Markovian analysis of time changes in political attitudes in the United States, the nature of the subject 
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When data is continuous, however, there is no such ‘natural’ division of the state space and 
the whole process of class definition becomes somewhat arbitrary. Two criteria commonly 
employed in the literature to discretize the continuous state space include equal log length 
(Champernowne 1953, Shorrocks 1976, Aebi, Neusser and Steiner 2001) and equal number of 
observations (Quah 1993a 1993b 1996a, Proudman and Redding 1998, Proudman et. al. 
1998). Two other criteria proposed in the literature include minimization of the area between 
the Lorenz curves corresponding to the continuous and discretized datasets (Aghevli and 
Mehran 1981, Davies and Shorrocks 1989) and minimization of errors generated by the use of 
a common discretization grid for the non-parametric representation of the data distributions in 
the first and last years of the dataset (Magrini 1998). The problem with all of these methods of 
discretization is that they completely ignore the Markovity of the problem, concentrating 
rather on the non-parametricity of the problem. The choice in the level of aggregation is then 
usually determined by choosing the maximum number of classes given a minimum number of 
observations per class. The virtual impossibility of thus correctly identifying the system of 
classification for which the Markov property holds is a fact that has been long and widely 
accepted in the literature. Bulli (2001) proposes a method of discretization of the continuous 
state space that automatically generates a system of classification for which the Markov 
property holds, but as previously mentioned, this solution compromises the simplicity of the 
Markovian framework. 
 
In this chapter, the fuzzification of the income class frontiers that is carried out in 
Section 4.1 circumvents in large part the whole problem of class definition. As such, the 
strategy employed in class definition is entirely motivated by concerns for statistical 
robustness. Classes are defined such that each class contains roughly the same number of 
observations. There are two related reasons for this. Firstly, given the limited number of 
observed transitions, they need to be shared amongst the classes. Ensuring the robust 
estimation of one of the off-diagonal transition probabilities by allocating disproportionate 
numbers of observations via class definition would come at the cost of the robust estimation 
of the other off-diagonal transition probabilities. Secondly, given the limited number of 
                                                                                                                                                        
under study leaves little scope for variation in class definition. Anderson (1954) defines the only three classes 
possible: ‘Republican’, ‘Democratic’ and ‘Don’t Know’. In the Markovian analysis of intergenerational 
occupational mobility, on the other hand, the researcher plays a more active role in class definition. Glass and 
Hall (1954) define the following seven classes: ‘Professional and higher administrative’, ‘Managerial and 
executive’, ‘Higher grade supervisory and non-manual’, ‘Lower grade supervisory and non-manual’, ‘Skilled 
manual and routine non-manual’, ‘Semi-skilled manual’, ‘Unskilled manual’. Prais (1955) takes a more 
aggregated approach and defines the following three classes: ‘Upper’, ’Middle’, ’Lower’. 
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observed transitions, and given that the shape of the ergodic distribution is defined by the 
ratios between the probabilities of such transitions, these transition probabilities need to be 
representative of proportionately similar numbers of observations. Twin peaks generated by 
the preponderant weight of a couple of observations in a class of few observations against the 
weight of more observations in a class of many observations is not as robust (because of the 
small sample size) as a peak generated by a straightforward imbalance between equally 
weighted probabilities. 
 
Note that such a strategy of class definition generally produces classes of variable length, 
as in the context of the cross-country convergence application where the class frontiers 
generated in this manner are: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 2, 5. In this paragraph, a slight digression is 
made to examine the implications of variable class length for interpretation of the ergodic 
distribution. The values taken by the elements of the ergodic distribution are implicitly 
interpreted as the heights of the bins of the histogram approximating the long-run distribution. 
This interpretation is only valid if the classes are of equal length because the values taken by 
the elements of the ergodic distribution actually represent the relative areas of the bins of this 
histogram. So, when classes are of variable length, the ergodic distribution needs to be scaled 
by these variable lengths in order to generate an accurate picture of the histogram 
approximating the long-run distribution. When this rescaling is carried out in the context of 
the cross-country convergence application, twin peaks give way to a much bleaker picture of 
the future in which relative poverty traps most countries. 
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This corrected picture of the histogram approximating the long-run distribution (c.f. Figure 5) 
corresponds to the picture resulting from Bulli’s (2001) continuous and discrete Markovian 
analyses of the evolution of the cross-country income distribution.11 
 
                                                 
11 There is a contradiction between the results presented in Table 2 and Figure 5 of Bulli (2001). The numerical 
results corroborate the poverty trap story, while the graphical results display a huge left-hand peak and a tiny 
right-hand peak. 
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Figure 5: Histogram of long-run tendencies  
(solid line: rescaled estimated crisp ergodic distribution; dashed lines: upper and lower bounds defining 95% 
confidence region) 
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In sum, precise estimation of the transition probability matrix relies on the 
identification of a system of classification for which the Markov property holds. In the 
remainder of this section, it is shown that when data is continuous any definition of classes 
(i.e. including the one for which the Markov property holds) introduces a bias into the 
estimated transition probability matrix (Section 3.1), a problem that is exacerbated by the 
presence of data inaccuracies in general (Section 3.2.1) and differential data inaccuracies in 
particular (Section 3.2.2). 
 
3.1   Discrete models and continuous data 
 
 In the simple Markov chain model, transitions are supposed to represent mobility. 
When classes are ‘well-defined’, transitions do represent mobility. By ‘well-defined’, I mean 
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that observations within the same classes are relatively homogeneous and that observations 
within different classes are relatively heterogeneous. When data is discrete, the ‘natural’ 
division of the state space generates ‘well-defined’ classes, and mobility is easily identified. 
When data is continuous, there is no such ‘natural’ division of the state space, classes are not 
‘well-defined’ and mobility is not as easily identified. The following two examples illustrate 
the implications of this ill-definition of classes for the precision of the estimated transition 
probability matrix. 
 
Figure 6: Transitions resulting from scenarios presented in Examples 1 to 4 
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Example 1: Immobile process A is represented by mobile transition matrix cAP . Suppose that 
the evolution of country A’s income closely follows the evolution of the world’s average 
income, regularly alternating between periods of marginally less than average world growth 
and periods of marginally higher than average world growth. In other words, suppose that 
country A’s income, as measured relative to the world average, remains essentially constant 
over time, oscillating between the values of 2.39 and 2.41. Figure 6 plots this surprisingly 
stable path over time through the distribution of income across countries. If the evolution of 
country A’s relative income is modeled as a Markov chain, and if the underlying continuous 
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state space is discretized such that the relative income defining the frontier between classes 3 
and 4 takes the value of 2.40, then the estimated transition probability matrix presents 
maximum mobility: 
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In this particular case where the country’s relative income marginally fluctuates about the 
level of relative income defining an income frontier, the simple Markov chain model provides 
a grossly misleading interpretation of the data. The problem lies in the continuity of the state-
space; such problems do not arise when the state-space is discrete. Whereas there is no real 
difference between values of 2.39 and 2.41 for relative income when the object of study is 
mobility within the distribution of income across countries, there is a clear difference between 
baker and butcher (even if these professions could be considered to be very similar) when the 
object of study is mobility within the distribution of professions across the active population.  
 
Example 2: Mobile process B is represented by immobile transition matrix cBP . Suppose that 
growth in country B’s income consistently exceeds growth in the world’s average income, 
starting the observation period at the bottom of the cross-country income distribution, and 
finishing the observation period at the top of the first class. Figure 6 plots this steady climb 
over time through the poorest class of the distribution of income across countries. If the 
evolution of country B’s relative income is modeled as a Markov chain, and if the underlying 
continuous state space is discretized such that the relative income defining the frontier 
between classes 1 and 2 takes the value of 0.8, then the estimated transition probability matrix 
presents maximum immobility: 
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In this particular case where the country’s relative income grows within the limits defined by 
the frontiers of one single income class, the simple Markov chain model provides a grossly 
misleading interpretation of the data. Once again, the problem lies in the continuity of the 
state-space; such problems do not arise when the state-space is discrete. Whereas the intra-
class growth in values of relative income from 0.05 to 0.75 is significant when the object of 
study is mobility within the distribution of income across countries, the intra-class mobility 
generated by the passage from cardiologist to hematologist is not significant at all when the 
object of study is mobility within the distribution of professions (not specialties) across the 
active population.  
 
3.2   Data inaccuracies 
 
 In the previous section, data inaccuracy was ignored. Given the huge sensitivity of the 
elements of the ergodic distribution to marginal perturbations to the transition probabilities, 
however, all potential sources of imprecision in the estimated transition probability matrix 
must be examined. In this section, two aspects of data inaccuracy are discussed, namely its 
existence and its variation across observations. It is shown how the simple Markov chain 
model is particularly sensitive to the existence of data inaccuracy, especially when it affects 
different observations to different degrees. 
 
3.2.1   Short-run noise vs. short-run dynamics  
 
 When data is continuous, the arbitrariness of the division of the state-space leads to ill-
defined classes and falsely generated transitions. When data contains inaccuracies, these can 
also contribute to generating mobility-unrelated transitions. This problem is particularly acute 
when data is continuous. If data inaccuracy is composed of encoding and measurement errors, 
it seems reasonable to assume that whereas both continuous and discrete data are similarly 
affected by encoding errors, the nature of continuous data makes it more prone to 
measurement error than discrete data. As illustrated below in Example 3, the lack of 
distinction between genuine transitions generated by short-run dynamics, and false transitions 
generated by short-run noise exacerbates the bias already imposed upon the estimated 
transition probability matrix by the use of a discrete model with continuous data. 
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Example 3: Short-run noise in process C and short-run dynamics in process D generate 
identical entries in the observed transition matrix. Consider a world of uncertainty in which 
data may contain errors. Suppose that the estimate of country C’s relative income remains 
essentially constant over time, deviating only once from its second class value of 1.5 to take 
on the third class value of 1.7. Suppose that the estimate of country D’s relative income grows 
consistently, starting the observation period in the middle of the second class of the cross-
country income distribution, and finishing the observation period in the middle of the third 
class. Figure 6 plots the paths of these two countries through the distribution of income across 
countries. If these paths are modeled as Markov chains, then the transition from class two to 
three that is shared by these very different countries during the fifth unit of observation 
generates identical observed transition matrices: 
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In our world of uncertainty, the robustness of the transition from class two to three is 
convincing when it occurs in the context of country D’s relative growth, but questionable 
when it occurs in the context of country C’s relative stagnation. In this realistic setting where 
short-run noise and short-run dynamics co-exist, the simple Markov chain model can provide 
a misleading interpretation of the data. The problem lies in the crippling effect of the presence 
of inaccuracies in the data upon the power of the Markov hypothesis to accurately represent 
the data. More specifically, the short-sightedness of the simple Markov chain model prevents 
it from using all of the information available to distinguish between identical transitions 
occurring in very different contexts.12 
 
                                                 
12 Just to be absolutely clear, it is not the Markovian characterization of the data that is problematic (i.e. this is 
not a question of model misspecification), but rather the detection of the true data underlying the error 
inaccuracies via the Markov hypothesis that poses a problem (i.e. this is a question of model identification).  
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3.2.2   Data inaccuracy differentials 
 
 Precise estimation of the transition probability matrix requires distinguishing between 
short-run dynamics and short-run noise. Even when the context provides clear identification 
of the nature of the variation, the simple Markov chain model is incapable of making such a 
distinction. As illustrated below in Example 4, this problem is further complicated by the 
existence of differences in the extent to which different observations are affected by data 
inaccuracy.  
 
Example 4: Very imprecise series of data generated by process E and very precise series of 
data generated by process F contribute equally to generating mobility in the estimated 
transition probability matrix. Consider a world of relative uncertainty in which data may 
contain different degrees of error. Suppose that poor country E’s very imprecise estimate of 
relative income and rich country F’s very precise estimate of relative income display identical 
fluctuations about the frontier between classes one and two and the frontier between classes 
four and five, respectively. Figure 6 plots the paths of these two countries through the 
distribution of income across countries. If these paths are modeled as Markov chains, then the 
transitions generated by these two series of very different quality data contribute equally to 
generating mobility in the estimated transition probability matrix: 
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In our world of relative uncertainty, the robustness of the transitions is convincing when the 
underlying data is very precise, but questionable when it is very imprecise; whereas the 
fluctuations in country F’s relative income could possibly reflect some sort of short-run 
dynamics, the fluctuations in country E’s relative income most probably reflect some sort of 
short-run noise. In this very realistic setting where short-run noise and short-run dynamics co-
exist in different proportions depending upon the quality of the data, the simple Markov chain 
model can provide a misleading interpretation of the data. The problem here is not one that is 
generated specifically by the application of the simple Markov chain model; the problem 
posed by differential data quality for inference is one that adversely affects many different 
models (Dawson, DeJuan, Seater, and Stephenson 2001). 
 
 As shown in this section, the continuity and the (differential) inaccuracy of the data 
pose fundamental problems for the precise estimation of the transition probability matrix. In 
Section 4, it is shown how very basic notions of fuzzy logic can be used to address most of 
these problems, rendering the simple Markov chain model amenable to continuous data of 
differential inaccuracy. In Section 5, it is shown how selective filtering can be used to address 
the rest of these problems, rendering the data amenable to the simple Markov chain model. 
 
4.   Fuzzification of the simple Markov chain model 
 
 What is fuzzy logic? In a nutshell, it is the rejection of a binary representation of the 
world in favour of a more realistic model. Things do not have to be black or white (i.e. crisp); 
they can be different shades of grey (i.e. fuzzy). By the same token, observed transitions 
should not have to take either zero or one as values; they should be able to take an 
intermediate value that is representative of the true degree of mobility characterizing the 
transition. Presumably, this added flexibility should help resolve the problems illustrated in 
Examples 1, 2 and 4.13  
 
 This argument can also be expressed in a more formal manner. In the application of 
the simple Markov chain model to panel data on income, the estimated transition probability 
matrix is used to extract information concerning the mobility of countries within the 
distribution of incomes from the dataset, information that is camouflaged by noise. In other 
                                                 
13 The problems illustrated in Example 3 will be addressed in Section 5. 
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words, true mobility )(tmij  is observed with error )(te , as described in the following 
expression. 
 
)()()( ttmtn ijij e+=                                 (13) 
 
In empirical applications of the simple Markov chain model, the noise is overlooked, and the 
following assumptions are implicitly made. 
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By explicitly taking the noise into account, it is possible to abandon this binary representation 
of the data in favour of a more detailed description of the data, as described in the following 
expressions:  
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where f is a function of the error term. Here, the error term is composed of three elements, 
namely model misspecification, short-run noise and differential data inaccuracy (c.f. Section 
3). In this section, fuzzification is used as a means of correcting the observed transition matrix 
for the first and the third of these elements. In the next section, selective filtration is used as a 
means of correcting the observed transition matrix for the second element of the error term. 
These corrections greatly improve the correspondence between the underlying data and the 
estimated transition probability matrix. 
 
How can fuzzy logic be implemented in the context of the cross-country convergence 
debate? Translating the whole class definition issue (c.f. Section 3.1) into fuzzy terms, it is the 
crispness of the frontiers chosen to delineate the fundamentally fuzzy classes that poses 
Part I. Chapter 2. Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate. 
62 
problems. Fuzzifying income class frontiers solves these problems. From a philosophical 
point of view, this fuzzification captures the inherent vagueness of the income group notion 
(i.e. classes become ‘well-defined’). From a modelling point of view, this fuzzification 
replaces some of the discreteness in the simple Markov chain model with continuity, by 
taking into account the mobility occurring throughout the distribution and not just the 
mobility occurring at the frontiers. From a statistical point of view, the fuzzification increases 
the robustness of the estimated ergodic distribution by increasing the numbers of observations 
generating the transitions. Fuzzification of the income class frontiers is presented below in 
Section 4.1. In the first subsection, the intuition is presented via examples, and in the second 
subsection, the optimal degree of fuzzification to be carried out is discussed.  
 
Translating the whole differential data inaccuracy issue (c.f. Section 3.2.2) into fuzzy 
terms, it is the uniform crispness of the differentially accurate observations that poses 
problems. Fuzzifying income observations solves these problems. From a modelling point of 
view, this fuzzification filters out short-run noise in a differential manner by directly 
incorporating the degree of inaccuracy inherent to the different observations into the method 
of accounting transitions. From a statistical point of view, once again the fuzzification 
increases the robustness of the estimated ergodic distribution by increasing the numbers of 
observations generating the transitions. Fuzzification of the income class frontiers is presented 
below in Section 4.2. In the first subsection, the intuition is presented via examples, and in the 
second subsection, the optimal degree of fuzzification to be carried out is discussed.  
 
4.1   Fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
 
4.1.1   Intuition and examples 
 
Fuzzification of the class frontiers is achieved by defining the classes as overlapping 
trapezoidal distributions intersecting at the points demarcating the crisp class frontiers (c.f. 
top half of Figure 7), instead of defining the classes as uniform distributions over the intervals 
demarcated by the crisp class frontiers. This implies defining a distribution over classes per 
country per unit of time (c.f. bottom half of Figure 7), instead of defining a single class per 
country per unit of time; observations of classes become observations of distributions over 
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classes. For example, an observation of a country with a relative income of 0.8 will no longer 
be allocated exclusively to class 2, but rather equally divided between class 1 and class 2.   
 
Figure 7: Fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
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In this manner, countries are no longer forced into a strictly ‘poor’, ‘average’ or ‘rich’ 
classification; countries can be described as mixes between neighbouring classifications (for 
example, ‘slightly poor, mostly average’). This conversion of the set of possible observations 
per class from whole numbers to rational numbers automatically generates rational values for 
the observed transitions as well. As illustrated below in the continuations of Examples 1 and 
2, estimating the transition probability matrix on the basis of this more detailed tabulation of 
transitions improves the correspondence between the mobility displayed by the time series of 
the data and the mobility displayed by the estimated transition probability matrix.  
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Example 1 continued: Immobile process A is represented by correspondingly immobile 
transition matrix fAP .  The observations made of country A’s path through the distribution of 
income across countries over time in the context of the crisp and fuzzy Markov chain models 
are collected below in cA  and fA  respectively: 
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Whereas both cA  and fA  record the existence of the fluctuations in country A’s path, only 
fA  supplies information on the nature (i.e. magnitude) of these fluctuations. When fA  is 
used to tabulate the numbers of observed transitions, and thus estimate the transition 
probability matrix and calculate the ergodic distribution, the following results are obtained: 
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Note that fuzzification of the income class frontiers corrects for the misleading mobility 
biasing cAP , while retaining the very reasonable estimate of ergodic distribution. 
 
Example 2 continued: Mobile process B is represented by correspondingly mobile transition 
matrix fBP . The observations made of country B’s path through the distribution of income 
across countries over time in the context of the crisp and fuzzy Markov chain models are 
collected below in cB  and fB  respectively: 
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Whereas cB  tells the overly simplified story of inter-class immobility, fB  tells the more 
detailed story of intra-class growth. When fB  is used to tabulate the numbers of observed 
transitions, and thus estimate the transition probability matrix and calculate the ergodic 
distribution, the following results are obtained: 
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Note that fuzzification of the income class frontiers corrects for the misleading immobility 
biasing both cBP and )(¥
c
Bn . 
 
4.1.2   How much fuzzification? 
  
 We have seen that fuzzification of the income class frontiers can be seen as the 
replacement of the crisp class frontiers by the intersections of trapezoidal distributions that are 
centered upon class midpoints. How should these trapezoids be chosen? Our only technical 
constraint is that the degrees of class membership must sum to one for each value of the 
continuum of relative incomes. Indeed, these values are probabilities and probabilities must 
sum to one.  In Figure 7 this can be understood as requiring that the vertical sum of the 
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distributions adds up to one. To this technical constraint, we can add a couple of common 
sense considerations that serve only to simplify the calculations. First, all class frontiers can 
be considered to be equally fuzzy. There is no reason to consider that the distinction between 
upper middle class and upper class is more clearly defined than that between lower class and 
lower middle class. Second, only the class frontiers between neighbouring classes are 
fuzzified, that is only adjacent trapezoidal distributions overlap. Defining an observation as a 
mix of three classes does not provide more information on its position within the continuum 
of relative incomes than defining the observation as a mix of two classes. The technical 
constraint and these two considerations imply that overlapping portions of the lateral sides of 
the trapezoids must have the same slope in absolute value and must intersect at the class 
frontiers at a class membership level of 0.5, and that the top and bottom sides of the 
trapezoids must sum to the width of the corresponding classes plus half the width of each of 
the neighbouring classes. Note that when classes are not of equal length, the lateral sides of 
the “trapezoids” become kinked (c.f. Figure 12). The degree of fuzzification can then be 
defined in terms of the width of the top side of the trapezoid relative to the width of the class.  
 
Minimum fuzzification occurs when the width of the top side of the trapezoid is equal 
to the width of the class (c.f. Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Minimum fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
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In this case, the trapezoid is actually a rectangle, and the classes are defined as uniform 
distributions over the intervals demarcated by the crisp class frontiers. Observations can only 
belong to one class at a time. Maximum fuzzification occurs when the width of the top side of 
the trapezoid is a point (c.f. Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: Maximum fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
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In this case, the trapezoid is actually a triangle, and the classes are defined as triangular 
distributions over the intervals demarcated by the crisp class frontiers. Observations always 
belong to a mix of two neighbouring classes, except for those occurring exactly at the class 
midpoints. The examples in the previous section present an intermediate level of fuzzification 
(c.f. Figure 7) with observations occurring in the neighbourhood of the class midpoints 
recorded as only one class, and the others recorded as mixes of two classes.  
 
In order to choose the most appropriate level of fuzzification, it helps to think about 
why we are carrying out this fuzzification. Fuzzification of the income class frontiers is a 
quick fix to some of the problems that arise when the simple Markov chain model is applied 
to continuous data (c.f. countries A and B in Examples 1 and 2). On the one hand we have 
continuous data which is rich in information but complex in analysis, and on the other hand 
we have the discrete Markov chain model which is simple in analysis but poor in information. 
This fuzzification allows one to apply the discrete Markov chain model to continuous data, 
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without sacrificing information and compromising the validity of the results. It allows 
observations not only to be allocated to a class (as usual in the discretization of continuous 
data), but to be positioned within that class as well. How exactly the observations are 
positioned within the classes depends upon the degree of the fuzzification that is chosen. 
Minimum fuzzification means that once the observations have been classified, all additional 
information is lost. The intermediate fuzzification that is carried out in the previous section 
retains additional information on the positions within the classes for those observations that 
occur within the neighbourhood of the class frontiers, but not for those that occur within the 
neighbourhood of the class midpoints. Maximum fuzzification means that all the information 
contained within the continuous data is retained after the discretization. This is exactly what 
we are looking for, a simple approach that does not sacrifice the wealth of information 
provided by the continuity of the data.   
 
So, is there really no reason for choosing less than maximum fuzzification of the 
income class frontiers? When applying the discrete Markov chain model to continuous data, 
the answer is yes. Contrary to the fuzzification of the income observations that is discussed in 
the next section, the choice of the degree of fuzzification of the income class frontiers cannot 
be thought of in the same terms as the choice of bandwidth of the kernel in non parametric 
density estimation. The key difference is that the choice of window width determines how 
much the observations are smoothed, whereas the choice of the degree of fuzzification 
determines how much the model is smoothed. Fuzzifying the income class frontiers is like 
rendering the discrete Markov chain model continuous while retaining the simplicity inherent 
in the discrete approach. So if the data is continuous, then the model must be adapted 
accordingly and completely. Partial fuzzification makes no sense. In Section 6.1, estimation 
of the simple Markov chain model with maximum fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
is carried out.  
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4.2   Fuzzification of the income observations 
 
4.2.1   Intuition and examples 
 
Fuzzification of the income observations is achieved by transforming the points 
observed on the continuum of relative incomes into triangular distributions centered on these 
points and defined over intervals that are directly proportional to the precision of the 
observations. In this manner, identical incomes observed for countries with different quality 
data are represented differently; observations from countries with relatively precise data are 
represented by relatively small-based triangles, and observations from countries with 
relatively imprecise data are represented by relatively large-based triangles. In order to 
integrate this new representation of the data into the simple Markov chain model, a new 
method of accounting transitions is required.  
 
The construction of the matrix of observed transitions is perhaps best explained with 
the aid of a concrete example. Consider a country’s grade ‘D’ relative income at two 
successive points in time. Grade “D” means that the confidence intervals for the observations 
can be constructed by taking the observation and subtracting off 30-40% of its value for the 
lower bound, and adding on 30-40% of its value for the upper bound. A value of 35% is used 
to carry out the calculations.  The first observation of relative income is 1.8, so the 
corresponding confidence interval is [1.17,2.43]. This observation can be fuzzified by 
replacing the point observation at 1.8 by a triangle with a base defined over [1.17,2.43], an 
apex positioned at 1.8 and an area equal to 1. This gives the distribution that is labelled “I” in 
Figure 10. The second observation of relative income is 2.2, so the corresponding confidence 
interval is [1.43,2.97]. Fuzzifying the observation gives the distribution that is labelled “II” in 
Figure 10.   
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Figure 10: Fuzzification of the income observations 
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Note that the observations lie within classes 2, 3 and 4. This means that the transition from I 
to II generates entries in the observed transitions matrix for those elements belonging to the 
three-by-three sub-matrix containing the observed transitions for classes 2, 3 and 4. The area 
under each of the distributions is divided into the parts occupying the different classes. Each 
part represents the probability that the observation belongs to that class; in this example, we 
have: 233.0)2( =ÎIP , 766.0)3( =ÎIP , 001.0)4( =ÎIP , 024.0)2( =ÎIIP , 
702.0)3( =ÎIIP  and 274.0)4( =ÎIIP . These probabilities can be used as shown below to 
calculate the probabilities associated with all of the possible transitions. 
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Carrying out these calculations for each pair of successive observations and summing over all 
of the resulting matrices generates the matrix of observed transitions. Estimation of the 
transition probability matrix and the ergodic distribution can then be carried out in the usual 
manner.  
 
In sum, this way of accounting transitions is based on the implicit assumption that the 
part of the data’s variance that is representative of true mobility is a positive function of 
quality. In other words, this way of accounting transitions is equivalent to adjusting the 
variance of the data in a differential manner, or to filtering the data of the differential short-
run noise. As illustrated below in the continuation of Example 4, estimating the transition 
probability matrix on the basis of this more detailed tabulation of transitions improves the 
correspondence between the quality of the data and the amount of mobility extracted from the 
data by the estimated transition probability matrix.  
 
Example 4 continued. Very imprecise series of data generated by process E and very precise 
series of data generated by process F contribute differentially to generating mobility in the 
estimated transition probability matrix. Suppose that the quality grades given to the data 
coming from countries E and F are ‘D’ and ‘A’ respectively. Grade ‘D’ remains defined as 
before.  Grade ‘A’ means that the data is observed with a precision of 5-10%. A value of 5% 
is used to carry out calculations. Figure 11 provides a picture of the fuzzification of the two 
series of data.  
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Figure 11: Fuzzification carried out in Example 4 
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Note the marked difference in the probabilities calculated for the two identically fluctuating 
series of different quality data. The results generated by the fuzzy Markov chain model are 
presented below. 
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Note that the mobility extracted from the fluctuations of the grade ‘A’ data is superior to that 
extracted from the same fluctuations present in the grade ‘D’ data (i.e. the off-diagonal 
elements of fEP  are bigger than the corresponding elements of 
f
FP ). Thus, fuzzification of the 
income observations cleans up part of the short-run noise biasing both cEP  and 
c
FP . 
 
4.2.2   How much fuzzification? 
  
We have seen that fuzzification of the income observations can be seen as the 
recording of the observations as triangular distributions rather than as points. How should 
these triangles be chosen? Replacing points by distributions is just smoothing over the space 
dimension. This brings us back to the issue of non parametric density estimation that is 
discussed in Section 2.2.  Viewed in this light, the question of the degree of fuzzification can 
be thought of in terms of the choice of the kernel’s bandwidth. As already discussed, a 
constant bandwidth is not appropriate to the data under analysis because this leads to 
oversmoothing some parts of the density and undersmoothing other parts of the density. The 
adaptive kernel addresses this drawback by allowing bandwidth to vary with data density 
(Silverman 1986). Fuzzification of the income observations addresses this drawback by 
allowing bandwidth to vary with data quality. This latter approach presents two advantatges 
when compared to the former approach. First, fuzzification is based upon economic criteria 
rather than some statistical criteria related to error minimization. It provides a way of 
including additional information on the quality of the data in the estimation process. Second, 
whereas the adaptive kernel can be chosen according to many different methods and therefore 
requires that the most appropriate method be chosen, fuzzification provides a natural answer 
to the bandwidth question. The bases of the triangles should span the confidence intervals of 
the observations. These advantages of the fuzzification approach can also be its disadvantage 
in the sense that this approach requires that information on the data quality be available, 
which is often not the case. 
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Thinking about fuzzification of the income observations in terms of non parametric 
density estimation brings up another related question. Why triangular distributions? Other 
kernels such as the Epanechnikov or the Gaussian kernels could conceivably be used as well, 
but in the absence of any information on the distribution of the errors in the data, there is no 
particular reason to further complicate calculations. In Section 6.2, estimation of the simple 
Markov chain model with fuzzification of the income observations is carried out.     
 
5.   Selective filtration of short-run noise 
 
 In the previous section, fuzzification of the simple Markov chain model was shown to 
correct for two of the three elements biasing the estimated transition probability matrix, 
namely the model misspecification resulting from the application of a discrete model to 
continuous data and the cross-sectional variations in short-run noise generated by the 
differentials in data inaccuracy. What these two elements have in common is that they both 
affect the empirical application in a general fashion; the problems posed by the model 
misspecification concern the full lengths of all of the income class frontiers, and the problems 
posed by the differential data inaccuracy concern the full lengths of the time series belonging 
to the different countries. The third element biasing the estimated transition probability 
matrix, the presence of short-run noise, differs from the first two elements in that it affects the 
empirical application in a very specific fashion; the problems posed by the existence of short-
run noise are only generated by certain observations. Whereas the general model re-
specification provided by fuzzification addresses the fundamental characteristics defining the 
problems generated by the model misspecification and the differential data inaccuracy, a 
different approach is required to solve the problems related to the presence of short-run noise. 
 
 Fuzzification of income observations resolves the problem of distinguishing between 
identical fluctuations generated by different quality data. Here the problem is to distinguish 
between identical fluctuations generated by same quality data, but having occurred in 
different contexts. The question is how to distinguish between short-run noise and short-run 
dynamics over time?  
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 A quick and easy solution to this problem is to very roughly smooth the times series 
using some sort of a moving average or moving median. By ‘very roughly’ I mean applying 
the minimum degree of smoothing possible (i.e. three periods), because the idea is just to 
eliminate short-run aberrations, and not to iron the short-run dynamics out of the series. The 
advantage of the median over the mean is that it completely eliminates fluke observations 
from the series, instead of just spreading the fluke over multiple observations.  
 
Example 3: Short-run noise in process C and short-run dynamics in process D generate 
identical entries in the observed transition matrix. Applying a 3 period moving median to 
each of the series prior to the estimation of the transition probability matrix maintains the 
short-run dynamics in process within the series D, and filters the short-run noise in process C 
out of the series. The observed transition matrix does not change for D, whereas the off-
diagonal transitions are wiped out from the one for C: 
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Notice that these results for the observed transition matrices can be equivalently expressed in 
terms of the ergodic distributions; corrections are carried out for C, whereas nothing changes 
for D. 
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6.   Results 
 
6.1   Fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
 
 Figure 12 depicts the maximum fuzzification of the income class frontiers that is 
carried out in this section. 
 
Figure 12: Maximum fuzzification of the income class frontiers 
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The estimation results are presented in Appendix A.2. The estimated fuzzy transition 
probability matrix is extremely similar to its crisp counterpart. Indeed, hypothesis testing 
indicates that the estimated fuzzy transition probability matrix falls within the confidence 
region calculated for its crisp counterpart. This similarity between the estimated transition 
matrices suggests that the incorrectly unaccounted intra-class mobility (c.f. Country B in 
Example 2) more or less compensates for the incorrectly accounted inter-class immobility 
(c.f. Country A in Example 1). The unscaled and rescaled fuzzy ergodic distributions not only 
fall within the confidence regions calculated for their crisp counterparts, they also display the 
same general shapes, twin peaks for the unscaled case and and poverty peak for the rescaled 
case.  
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 What does fuzzification add to the standard Markovian analysis of the cross-country 
convergence issue? Efficiency. Whereas the crisp results are based upon only 156 total 
observed transitions, and contained within uselessly huge confidence regions (c.f. Appendix 
A.1), the fuzzy results are based upon 4077 observations of transitions14, and contained within 
much tighter confidence regions (c.f. Appendix A.2). Indeed, the confidence region calculated 
for the rescaled fuzzy ergodic distribution is tight enough to render the poverty trap 
characterization of the ergodic distribution robust (c.f. Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13: Histogram of long-run tendencies  
(solid line: rescaled estimated fuzzy income group ergodic distribution; dashed lines: upper and lower bounds 
defining 95% confidence region) 
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14 In the fuzzy analysis, the number of observed transitions ( N ) differs from the number of observations of 
transitions ( countN ) because, contrary to the crisp analysis, observations can take rational values.   
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6.2   Fuzzification of the income observations 
 
Fuzzification of the income observations is carried out using the partially subjective 
confidence intervals provided by Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) and Summers and 
Heston (1984, 1991, 1994, 2002). Grade “A” data is precise to more or less 5-10%, grade “B” 
data to 10-20%, grade “C” data to 20-30%, and grade “D” data to 30-40%. Values of 5%, 
15%, 25% and 35% are used to carry out the calculations. The estimation results are presented 
in Appendix A.3. Although the fuzzy results remain similar to the crisp results, certain 
differences do appear. The estimated fuzzy transition probability matrix no longer falls within 
the confidence region calculated for its crisp counterpart, the fuzzy transition matrix 
presenting significantly more mobility than its crisp counterpart. The unscaled fuzzy ergodic 
distribution remains twin-peaked, but the peaks have lost in prominence. The rescaled fuzzy 
ergodic distribution continues to present its poverty peak. 
 
 Once again, fuzzification adds efficiency to the standard Markovian analysis of the 
cross-country convergence issue. Whereas the crisp results are based upon only 156 total 
observed transitions, and contained within uselessly huge confidence regions (c.f. Appendix 
A.1), the fuzzy results are based upon 3961 observations of transitions, and contained within 
much tighter confidence regions. As before, the confidence region calculated for the rescaled 
fuzzy ergodic distribution is tight enough to render the poverty trap characterization of the 
ergodic distribution robust (c.f. Figure 14). 
 
Part I. Chapter 2. Fuzzifying the Cross-Country Income Convergence Debate. 
79 
Figure 14: Histogram of long-run tendencies  
(solid line: rescaled estimated fuzzy income observation ergodic distribution; dashed lines: upper and lower 
bounds defining 95% confidence region) 
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 As illustrated in Examples 1 and 2, fuzzification greatly changes (improves) the 
Markovian representation of a single country’s path through the cross-country income 
distribution. Because of the Law of Large Numbers, however, fuzzification does not 
fundamentally alter the Markovian representation of aggregate world mobility. The 
contribution of fuzzy logic to the cross-country convergence application is to render the 
results of the simple Markov chain model statistically robust. 
 
7.   Concluding remarks 
 
 In the cross-country income convergence debate, the use of a discrete Markov chain 
model to approximate a continuous phenomenon introduces enough noise into the estimation 
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process to undermine the robustness of results. The estimated transition probability matrix is 
biased and the resulting ergodic distribution fragile. Fuzzification of both the income class 
frontiers and the income observations provides two continuous adaptations of the discrete 
Markov chain model that improve the robustness of the results in a complementary fashion. 
Why fuzzification improves robustness can be understood in terms of statistical efficiency. 
The crisp Markov chain model can only extract binary information from the data, whereas the 
fuzzy Markov chain model can extract more refined information as well. Thus the fuzzy 
adaptation improves results by extracting information that is left behind by the crisp model 
from the noise and using it in a meaningful manner. 
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Appendix A.1: Results from the crisp application of the simple Markov chain 
model 
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Appendix A.2: Results from the fuzzy income class application of the simple 
Markov chain model 
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Appendix A.3: Results from the fuzzy income observation application of the 
simple Markov chain model 
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Chapter 3 
Nature versus Nurture: 
An empirical analysis of the division of labor  
within American couples 
 
Abstract: Why are women less active than men on the labor market? Is it choice or constraint? 
My results show that observed labor market participation does not reflect true preferences. I 
use PSID data for 2001 to estimate a simultaneous equations model in which time spent doing 
work around the house and on the labor market by ‘husbands’ and ‘wives’ are the four 
endogenous variables. In order to identify true preferences, I use four different proxies for the 
distribution of power between spouses. For wives, an increased share of the total education 
and wages for the couple is accompanied by an increased probability of working longer 
hours. For husbands, an increased proportion of women available on the remarriage market is 
accompanied by an increased probability of working shorter hours. These increases in 
probabilities are sufficient to alter the effective labor supply of both spouses. 
 
Keywords: Marriage model; Time allocation; Housework; Labor supply; Power. 
 
JEL classification: D13 ; J12 ; J16 ; J22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fewer women than men participate in the US labor market. When women do 
participate, they work fewer hours on average than men (see Figures 1a and 1c). Why are 
women less active than men on the labor market? Is it nature or nurture, choice or constraint? 
My results show that observed labor market participation does not reflect true preferences.  
 
Disentangling choice from constraint is difficult. To do this, I use intra-spousal 
bargaining power as a means of identifying the wife’s freedom of choice. The more power a 
wife has relative to her husband, the more her actions will reflect her preferences. Four 
proxies for power are used: age, education, wage and local sex ratios. Using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on cohabiting couples for 2001, I carry out 
multinomial probit regressions of female labor market participation upon the four “power” 
variables. The results show that wives exploit education and wage power to work longer 
hours. The coefficients on the education and wage power variables are positive and 
significantly different from zero, meaning that an increased contribution by the wife to the 
total education and wages for the couple leads to an increased probability of her working 
longer hours. Conversely, wives without such power work shorter hours. In other words, the 
effective labor market supply of wives is constrained at levels that are below preferred ones.  
 
For illustrative purposes, consider a “typical” woman with a college degree and the 
corresponding average wage. My results show that this same woman will most probably work 
full-time when she is more powerful than her husband, and part-time when she is less 
powerful. When this woman lives with a less powerful man (i.e. one with less education and a 
lower wage), she has a 26% chance of working part-time and a 44% chance of working full-
time. When this woman lives with a more powerful man (i.e. one with more education and a 
higher wage), her chance of working part-time increases by 14% to reach 40%, and her 
chance of working full-time decreases by 11% to reach 33%. More generally, my results show 
that wives in more powerful situations are free to work more and that wives in less powerful 
situations are constrained to work less.  
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1.1   Female labor market preferences are important for policy 
 
If the difference between the labor force participation of men and women is indeed 
due to constraint and not to choice, then what we are witnessing on labor markets is a 
violation of the basic human right to equity and a huge waste of economic efficiency. Such a 
ubiquitous market failure would require government intervention. Public inertia would 
continue to cost society in terms of lower GDP, reduced growth and diminished welfare. 
 
From a microeconomic point of view, the optimal allocation of resources within a 
market economy relies upon competition and the barriers to entry to the labor market faced by 
women severely limit the scope and intensity of this competition. Moreover, in a market 
economy where two thirds of the consumers are women, a woman’s personal know-how (in 
addition to her technical know-how) is a valuable resource. Indeed, it has been shown that 
when this resource is tapped, firms’ financial results are higher.15   
 
From a macroeconomic point of view, the ageing of the population is imposing an 
increasing strain on public resources (The Economist 2006), and the barriers to entry faced by 
women only serve to further burden these public resources. Increased female participation in 
the labor market would help alleviate this problem by expanding the tax base and reducing 
government transfers. Moreover, it would allow society to cash in on the return to the 
monumental investment made in the education of girls and women. 
 
Castleman and Reed (2003) sum up the basic message in this subsection in a 
particularly poignant manner: “The significance of the debate between those who stress the 
social constraints on career-family choices and those who stress voluntarist decision-making 
and choice rests on the social implications for social policy at least as much as theoretical 
explanations of behaviour. If our social institutions and attitudes constrain women and men to 
limiting options, then we are bound to take action. If the outcomes are explained in terms of 
what people want to do anyway, then action is both futile and counterproductive” (p.2). 
                                                 
15 For example, the U.S. Glass Ceiling Commission’s 1995 Report (p.14) cites the results of a confidential study 
carried out by Covenant Investment Management: “Companies which rated in the bottom 100 on glass ceiling 
related measures earned an average of  7.9% return on investment, compared to an average return of 18.3% for 
the top 100.” See also Rappoport etal. (2002) for a dynamic exploration of how improved work / private-life 
integration (not work-family balance) con foster better business outcomes and increase workplace performance 
and productivity. 
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1.2   Female labor market preferences are controversial. 
 
Lisa Belkin’s article in The New York Times Magazine on “The Opt-Out Revolution” 
and the nation-wide debate that it inspired illustrates the controversy surrounding the whole 
“choice versus constraint” question, and identifies key elements that must be considered when 
analyzing it. The main issue at stake was the identification of preferences. Belkin (2003) 
claimed that highly successful careerwomen with university degrees from top American 
universities are leaving the labor market in order to stay at home to care for their young 
children because “they don’t want to [run the world]”. Other journalists vigorously opposed 
her conclusions (Bauchner 2003, Douglas 2003, Pollitt 2003, Walsh 2003, Young 2004), 
highlighting instead the lack of alternatives: “Neither woman [discussed in Belkin’s article] 
could get a part-time contract – it was ‘all or nothing.’ They didn’t want to go back home, 
they wanted normal hours or, failing that, part-time jobs at decent salaries with real 
opportunities for advancement. If quitting was a ‘choice,’ it was a very constrained one” 
(Pollitt 2003).   
 
This opposition between journalists mirrors a similar controversy between the general 
approaches taken in economics and sociology. Whereas both approaches are wary of the 
practical validity of people’s stated preferences (in this case, those reported by the 
journalists), each approach deals with this problem differently. Empirical economists believe 
that true preferences are revealed by actions, and they use these revealed preferences to 
rationalize the status quo (i.e. if a woman does not work, it must mean that she does not want 
to work) (Kan 2005). In this sense, economists belong to the « nature » school. Sociologists 
question revealed preferences as much as stated preferences, viewing opinions and actions as 
constituting interdependent components of some sort of “coping mechanism” (i.e. some sort 
of ex-post justification of an action that an individual is “forced” to take ex-ante). They focus 
efforts on identifying the constraints shaping individuals’ opinions and actions (Kan 2005). In 
this sense, sociologists belong to the « nurture » school. Duesenberry (1960) sums up the 
economics/sociology dichotomy in the following manner: “… the difference between 
economics and sociology is very simple. Economics is all about how people make choices. 
Sociology is all about why they don’t have any choices to make” (p.233). 
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Even within the economics literature a similar controversy is found. Grossbard-
Schechtman (2003) builds upon the basic belief that women prefer not participating in the 
labor market and finds evidence in favor of the opt-out theory. She constructs a theoretical 
model that “is most applicable to women who prefer not to work in the labor market” (p.16), 
and then demonstrates that current trends are consistent with her model. Goldin (2006) builds 
upon the basic belief that women prefer participating in the labor market and finds evidence 
against the opt-out theory. She postulates that “… most [women] perceive their work as a 
fundamental aspect of their satisfaction in life …” (p.12), and then demonstrates how the 
Current Population Survey and the College and Beyond datasets do not support any current 
trend towards an opt-out revolution. 
 
1.3   General approach 
 
These controversies demonstrate how difficult it is to pin down preferences. This is 
my first point. Another two fundamental issues relating to the female labor market 
participation decision, need to be discussed: the presence of labor market rigidities and the 
role of the husband within the household. 
 
 My second point is that labor market rigidities play a prominent role in the context of 
the opt-out debate. Most jobs just come in a couple of flavors (Martinez-Granado 2005): part-
time and full-time. As we move up the career ladder, more and more jobs come in the single 
take-it-or-leave-it, whatever-it-takes-to-get-done, full-time flavor. Going back to Figures 1a 
and 1c, we see that 42% of wives work either 0 or 40 hours a week and that 44% of husbands 
work either 40, 45 or 50 hours a week.  
 
My third point is that the role of the husband in the process of household time 
allocation is strikingly absent from the whole opt-out debate. Rhode notes this absence and 
comments: “If women are not choosing to run the world it is because men are not choosing to 
run the washer dryer” (Burk, Gillette & Rhode 2005). Implicit in this remark is the 
application of a very particular model of household time allocation to interpret the opt-out 
evidence. First, husbands choose their contributions to housework and to market work. 
Second, wives do whatever remains to be done around the house (the husband’s housework 
choice thus acts as a constraint upon the wife’s housework choice). Third, wives do whatever 
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they have time left to do on the labor market (the housework choices act as a constraint upon 
the wife’s market work choice).  
 
Combining these three issues in a potentially provocative manner for illustrative 
purposes, I construct the following hypothetical scenario. The husband decides not to run the 
washer-dryer (i.e. he does not make a substantial contribution to housework) and the wife is 
thus allocated the task of running the washer dryer (i.e. the bulk of the housekeeping 
activities). This housework occupies her for 20 hours a week. Given this burden, she does not 
want to work more than 40 hours a week on the labor market. But given her qualifications, the 
only jobs available to her are 60 hours a week. And so she is faced with the all-or-nothing 
choice of doing a “double-shift” or becoming a stay-at-home mom. Actually there is also a 
third option; she could leave her spouse (c.f. cooperative bargaining models, i.e. Manser & 
Brown 1981 and McElroy & Horney 1981). Separation or divorce would provide the 
researcher with a clear signal of preferences. Unfortunately (at least for the researcher), 
dissatisfaction with the intra-spousal distribution of housework does not systematically result 
in marital dissolution. Two other outcomes are just as compatible with the same underlying 
preferences. The wife could remain married, but unhappily so (c.f. non-cooperative 
bargaining models, i.e. Lundberg & Pollack 1995 / 1996). Or, the wife could construct some 
sort of coping mechanism allowing her to remain married, and happily so (Hochschild 1989). 
We are back to the problem of preference identification. 
 
In this paper, I model the process of household time allocation in the most general 
manner possible. Each of the four time variables (the time spent doing house or market work 
by the wife or the husband) is allowed to depend upon the other three time variables. For 
example, the time spent doing housework by the wife is regressed upon the time spent doing 
housework by the husband, the time spent doing market work by the wife and the time spent 
doing market work by the husband. Labor market rigidities are incorporated into the model by 
defining the time spent doing market work by each of the spouses as discrete variables. 
 
In the next section, I go into more detail about the identification strategy adopted in 
this paper, and in the following section, I present a brief review of the literature. The 
empirical model is presented in Section 4, the dataset and variables in Section 5, and the 
empirical findings and discussion in Section 6. The last section concludes. 
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2.   Identification 
 
2.1   Power 
 
Choices result from the maximization of utility, subject to constraints. When there are 
many constraints, the choice reveals primarily information about the constraints. When there 
are fewer constraints, the choice reveals more information about the preferences. This basic 
idea in economics is formulated in terms of power in sociology. According to Max Weber, 
“… power is … every opportunity/possibility existing within a social relationship, which 
permits one to carry out one's own will, even against resistance, and regardless of the basis on 
which this opportunity rests.” I exploit this semi-tautological relationship between preferences 
and power to turn a tricky preference identification problem into a simpler power 
identification problem. 
 
So, what is power? I adopt the view implicit in Weber’s definition that power is a very 
broad notion that can take many different forms. These forms can be material or 
psychological, and power is different for different people. Whereas in some couples money 
might tip the balance of power in favor of the spouse earning the money, in other couples fear 
of loneliness might tip the balance of power away from the spouse fearing loneliness.  
 
In this paper, I use four proxies for power: age, education, wage and sex ratios. The 
first three proxies for power, age, education and wage, all contribute to representing the 
material aspect of the intra-spousal distribution of power. Age is a tricky variable because on 
the level of wisdom it generally favors the individual, but on the level of beauty the effect 
tends to be the opposite. I choose to think of age in terms of the labor market, in terms of 
providing the older spouse with a first-mover advantage over the younger spouse. The idea is 
that when the younger spouse moves into the labor market, his/her choice is made given 
whatever his/her spouse has already chosen to do.  Whether or not this constraint is binding is 
one of the focuses of this paper. I include education and wage to represent potential and 
effective access to resources. I am not interested in the absolute levels of these variables, but 
how having more or less of it than your spouse constrains or enables your choices. The last 
proxy for power, sex ratios, contributes to capturing the psychological aspect of the intra-
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spousal distribution of power. This variable measures the relative abundance of potential new 
partners in the event of a break-up; it measures relative power on the remarriage market. 
 
2.2   Specialization and exchange 
 
 If you are an economist, you might be thinking that the power story in general, and the 
wage power story in particular, is just a specialization and exchange story in disguise. In this 
section, I would like to clarify why you should not expect this to be the case ex-ante (i.e. 
before the econometric analysis), and why this proves not to be the case ex-post (i.e. after the 
econometric analysis). To be absolutely clear right from the start, the results for the wives are 
compatible with the specialization and trade story, but the results for the husbands are not. 
 
So, how can I distinguish the power story from the specialization and exchange story? 
According to the specialization and exchange story, the spouse with the higher wage 
specializes in market work, and the other spouse specializes in housework. Note that this story 
is genderless. In other words, if this theory is true, then there are only two possible scenarios. 
In the first scenario, the husband earns a higher wage than the wife, so he specializes in 
market work, leaving her to specialize in housework. In the second scenario, the wife earns a 
higher wage than the husband, so she specializes in market work leaving him to specialize in 
housework. If empirical observations reveal that intra-spousal time allocation cannot be 
described by one of these two scenarios (i.e. if intra-spousal time allocation proves to be 
gendered), then the specialization and exchange story cannot be used to describe intra-spousal 
time allocation. In this case, the power story provides an alternative interpretation of the 
evidence. 
 
 In this paper, both descriptive and inferential statistics reveal much behaviour that 
confirms the first scenario and some behaviour that contradicts the second scenario. That 
husbands who earn the higher wage specialize in market work and that wives who earn the 
lower wage specialize in housework comes as no surprise (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Intraspousal time allocation when the husband earns a higher wage than the wife
(Note: The outcome predicted by specialization and trade theory is indicated in bold.)
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In 73% of the couples, the husband earns a higher wage than his wife. In this context, the 
specialization and exchange story points to the first scenario. The outcomes corresponding to 
this scenario are indicated in bold. Note that 84% of these couples act in accordance with the 
first scenario. So far, so good. But the specialization and exchange story breaks down when it 
is the wives who earn higher wages than their husbands (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Intraspousal time allocation when the wife earns a higher wage than the husband
(Note: The outcome predicted by specialization and trade theory is indicated in bold.)
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In 27% of the couples, the wife earns a higher wage than her husband. In this context, the 
specialization and exchange story points to the second scenario. The outcomes corresponding 
to this scenario are indicated in bold. Note that only 15% of these couples act in accordance 
with the second scenario. Indeed, this second intra-spousal time allocation matrix looks rather 
similar to the first one, meaning that wages do not seem to matter for the distribution of tasks.  
 
 This gendered intra-spousal allocation of time is perhaps even more evident for 
couples in which one of the spouses does not do any market work. In this case, specialization 
and exchange theory predicts that the stay-at-home spouse does more housework than the 
breadwinner spouse. Once again, this theory is verified when it is the wives who stay at home, 
but not when it is the husbands who stay at home (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Histogram of intra-spousal housework time allocation when one spouse does 
not do market work 
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95% of the stay-at-home wives compensate for their unemployment with a relatively higher 
contribution to household production. The equivalent number for the stay-at-home husbands 
is only 21%. 1% of the husbands with stay-at-home wives contribute more to household 
production than their wives. The equivalent number for the wives of stay-at-home husbands is 
60%.   
 
 In sum, it seems that most wives do more housework than their husbands, whether or 
not wives earn higher wages than husbands.16 Of course, these are only descriptive statistics, 
so I still need to explicitly hold constant a whole host of other factors in order to conclude 
anything from this information. When I do hold these other variables constant, as is done in 
the empirical analysis, these results are maintained. The point that I would like to make in this 
section is just that this paper presents evidence that raise doubts about the validity of the 
specialization and exchange story, and explores an alternative explanation, a story about 
power. 
                                                 
16 This asymmetry is somewhat of a stylized fact in Sociology, and the explanation is correspondingly 
asymmetrical. Exchange theory, as sociologists call specialization and exchange theory, is used to explain time 
allocation behavior for couples in which the husband earns more than the wife does, and gender theory is used to 
explain time allocation behavior for the rest of the couples. I argue that for specialization and exchange theory to 
hold, intra-spousal time allocation behavior cannot be gendered.  
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3.   Literature review 
 
3.1   Socio-economic approaches to preferences 
 
Most of the socio-economic literature on the household time allocation problem does 
not focus on preferences themselves, but rather on the household decision-making process 
(for reviews, see Mattila-Wiro 1999, Anxo & Carlin 2004 and Pollack 2005). Two notable 
exceptions are economist Becker and sociologist Hakim. Becker places preferences beyond 
(economic) theory (Stigler & Becker 1977, Godwin 1991), whereas Hakim places preferences 
at the center of (sociological) theory (Hakim 2000). Whereas Becker and Hakim position 
themselves in diametric opposition, mainstream economics and sociology meet somewhere in 
the middle. With this paper, I position myself upon this middle ground. 
 
In Sociology, Hakim takes an extreme and controversial stance by proposing that in 
modern societies17, “women have genuine choices and female heterogeneity is revealed to its 
full extent” (Hakim 2000: 22). She provides highly contested evidence that stated preferences 
correspond to revealed preferences (Bruegel 1996, Ginn etal. 1996, Procter & Padfield 1999, 
McRae 2003) and she concludes that these preferences correspond to true preferences. 
Preference theory thus mitigates the role of constraints, thereby placing it in stark opposition 
to the rest of the sociological literature, which focuses on constraints and not on preferences 
(Kan 2005).  
 
In Economics, Becker takes an equally extreme and controversial stance by proposing 
that “one may usefully treat tastes as stable over time and similar among people” (Stigler & 
Becker 1977: 76). In other words, Becker says that tastes do not matter. However, subsequent 
research has shown that tastes do matter, especially for welfare.  
 
Becker’s proposition constitutes the basis of his unitary household time allocation 
model in which the distribution of the spouses’ time between household and market 
                                                 
17 For Hakim (2000), a modern society is one in which the following five conditions are fulfilled: occurrence of 
the contraceptive revolution, occurrence of the equal opportunities revolution, expansion of white-collar 
occupations, creation of jobs for secondary earners, and increasing importance of values in lifestyle choices. 
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production activities results from the maximization of one single utility function. Much of the 
economic literature in the field has been spent refuting the unitary model in favor of collective 
models (cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models) that take into account both 
spouses’ utility functions. So, tastes do matter. 
 
Moreover, Pollack raises an additional issue of particular interest here in his response 
to Becker: “For positive analysis, whether we attribute differences in behavior to unobserved 
differences in household technology rather than to unobserved differences in taste is mere 
semantics. For welfare analysis, however, whether we attribute differences in behavior to 
differences in technology rather than to differences in tastes can alter conclusions about 
whether a policy change increases or decreases welfare” (Pollack 2003:116). So, tastes do 
matter, especially for welfare. 
 
Following Pollack’s reasoning one step further, we see that economic and sociological 
thought meet in the middle ground between Becker and Hakim: “Variable tastes undermine 
the normative significance of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics which asserts … 
that in competitive equilibrium everyone gets what he wants … However, if tastes are 
sufficiently malleable, then this may be no more than a corollary of the more general 
proposition that people come to want what they get” (Pollack 1978:374, McCrate 1988). This 
description corresponds to what sociologists call “coping mechanisms”, those ex-post 
justifications that individuals use to rationalize actions that they were “forced” to take ex-ante 
(Hochschild 1989). I position my paper in this middle ground shared by economics and 
sociology, where stated and revealed preferences meet and mingle, necessitating an 
identification strategy to disentangle the two. 
 
3.2   Evidence on preferences 
 
The economic literature providing empirical results on women’s labor market 
preferences is sparse. A couple of papers that do present such evidence for the United States 
identify preferences using divorce and marital property legislation. Legislation on divorce and 
marital property affects what each spouse can expect to walk away with in the case of divorce 
thus affecting each spouse’s external threat point and the balance of power between the 
spouses. Results are mixed. Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) use cross-sectional data 
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within a collective framework to show that in states where the divorce and marital property 
laws are favorable to women, female labor supply is lower that in other states. Gray (1998) 
uses a dynamic approach within a bargaining framework to show that changes in the divorce 
and marital property laws that were favorable to women generated an increase in female labor 
supply.  
 
4.   Empirical model 
 
 I do not want to impose any particular model of the time allocation process upon the 
data, so I choose to take Ghysel’s (2003) approach which is general enough to nest the two 
main family labor supply models (the unitary and collective models). Each of the four time 
variables (the time spent doing house or market work by the wife or the husband) could 
potentially depend upon the other three, so these four variables are modeled as conditional 
labor supply functions and estimated within a simultaneous equations framework.  
 
 My starting point is the household’s utility function V , which combines each spouse’s 
individual utility iU  in a way that depends upon the distribution of power between them a : 
 
),,( ahw UUVV =  
 
where w  indicates wife and h  indicates husband. Each individual spouse’s utility function 
depends upon own consumption ix , spouse’s consumption jx , household production H , own 
leisure il , spouse’s leisure jl , and personal characteristics ig : 
 
),,,,,( ijijiii llHxxUU g=  
 
Spouses maximize their personal functions subject to the (i) budget constraint, (ii) household 
technology constraint, and (iii) time constraint: 
 
(i)                           ),,,,,,( ijijjiii yyymwmwfpx ga=  
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where p  is the general price level, iw  is own wage, jw  is spouse’s wage, im  is own market 
work time, jm  is spouse’s market work time, iy  is own non-labor income, jy  is spouse’s 
non-labor income, and y  is household non-labor income; 
 
(ii)                                         ),,( bji hhHH =  
 
where ih  is own housework time, jh  is spouse’s housework time, and b  is determinants of 
household production dependant upon couple characteristics; 
 
(iii)                                      iii lhmT ++=  
 
where T  is total time available for different activities (i.e. 16 or 24 hours, depending upon 
whether you count sleep as leisure or not). Incorporating these constraints into the individual 
utility functions, I can rewrite the household utility function in the following more 
informative manner: 
 
),,,,,,,,,,,,( hwhwhwhwhw yyywwhhmmVV ggba=  
 
 Using this definition of the household utility function within Pollack’s (1969, 1971) 
framework of conditional demand functions, I derive the demand functions for house and 
market work time for each of the spouses (see Lundberg 1988 and Ghysels 2003 for similar 
applications of the conditional demand approach within the labor supply context). The idea 
here is to allow each spouse’s time allocation decision in one sphere (house or market) to 
potentially depend upon their own time allocation in the other sphere and the other spouse’s 
time allocations in both spheres. More concretely, I maximize the household utility function 
relative to each of the four time variables separately, conditional upon the values taken by the 
remaining three time variables. For spouse i , this gives me: 
 
),,,(max
),,,(max
jijiii
jijiii
hhmmVV
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=
=
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where  indicates the pre-allocated values. This maximization procedure generates a set of 
four demand functions. For spouse i , this gives me: 
 
),,,,,,,,,,,(
),,,,,,,,,,,(
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*
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It is this system of four simultaneous equations that is the object of estimation. I take an 
equation-by-equation approach, estimating the continuous housework time equations using 
OLS and the discrete market work time equations using ordered probit. Such an approach 
necessitates a two-stage estimation procedure.  
 
In the first stage, instrumentation is carried out for husbands’ and wives’ wages and 
the four time variables. These six variables are all endogenous variables so they need to be 
instrumented in order to include them in the regressions on the right-hand side. Also, wages 
are not observed for those people who do not work, so wages need to be assigned to these 
people.  
 
In the second stage, the set of four equations is estimated. Econometric identification 
of the system of simultaneous equations is achieved via a combination of functional form and 
exclusion restrictions. Using OLS for the housework time equations imposes a linear 
functional form upon the estimators of the coefficients in those equations, and using the probit 
estimation procedure for the market work time equations imposes a nonlinear functional form 
upon the estimators of the coefficients in those equations; this ensures identification of the 
housework time equations. Including a squared term for the wives’ housework time in the 
wives’ market work time equation further contributes to the identification of the wives’ 
housework time equation. As for the exclusion restrictions, I impose two. First, I assume that 
not all of the couple characteristics are included in the market work equations. Indeed, the 
number of rooms and the number of cars corresponding to a couple might have a direct 
impact upon housework hours, but not upon labor market hours. This exclusion restriction 
ensures identification of the market work time equations. Second, I assume that whereas all of 
the personal characteristics contained in ig  are included in each of the equations, only some 
of these characteristics for the spouse are included in the different equations. This exclusion 
restriction enhances overall identification of the system as a whole. 
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Before moving on to the more empirical part of this paper, I need to explicit how 
theory would manifest itself within this empirical framework. For the specialization and 
exchange story, the answer is easy. In the housework equations, the coefficients on the less-
wage-power dummy need to be positive, and the coefficients on the more-wage-power 
dummy negative. In the market work equations, the coefficients on the less-wage-power 
dummy need to be negative, and the coefficients on the more-wage-power dummy positive. 
For the power story, I have no answer. The whole point of such a flexible econometric 
framework is to let the data reveal to us the true preferences of husbands and wives. The risk 
is that the results are compatible with the specialization and exchange story, situation in 
which it will not be possible to distinguish between the alternative explanations.  
 
5.   Dataset and variables 
 
 The data comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the interview 
year 2001. This dataset provides information on a representative sample of the American 
population. My sample is composed of cohabiting couples residing within the US, in which 
both ‘spouses’ are between the ages of 25 and 59, endpoints included. To simplify 
communication, I refer to the partners of these co-habiting couples as ‘husband’ and wife’, 
even though they might not be married. I exclude younger and older couples to minimize the 
impact of any specific behaviour related to studies and to retirement. The data is obtained 
through an interview with one of the two spouses, and I limit my sample to couples for which 
the data on the variables required is complete (i.e. couples with ‘Don’t Know’ or ‘Not 
Applicable’ responses are eliminated from the sample). This gives me 1788 observations. 
 
5.1   Housework and market work: whwh hhmm  and ,,  
 
 The four main variables are the weekly hours spent by each of the spouses doing work 
around the house or on the labor market (housework and marketwork, respectively). The 
number of hours spent on housework every week comes from the answer to the following 
question: “About how much time do you spend on housework in an average week? (I mean 
time spent cooking, cleaning and doing other work around the house.).” The number of hours 
spent on the labor market every week is calculated by dividing the “Total hours of work in 
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2000” by the number of “Work weeks in 2000”. The annual hours of work is itself a synthetic 
variable calculated by PSID using the following equation: “Work weeks on main job x Work 
hours per week + Overtime work hours + Extra work hours.”  
 
The accuracy of the data on these four main variables is certainly questionable. The 
definition supplied of housework is vague, so tasks that one respondent includes, another 
might not. Furthermore, the answer to the housework question relies upon accurate and 
objective recall as well as truthful reporting. Accurate recall is already difficult in and of itself 
given the irregular timing of at least some housework, and when you take into account the 
generally unpleasant nature of housework, time spent doing housework has a funny way of 
seeming interminably long. Housework has the additional characteristic of being a socially 
desirable activity, so since people generally do not want to be considered a slob or a free-
rider, there is an incentive for respondents to exaggerate their contributions. The data on labor 
market hours should not suffer from these same potential inaccuracies. Hours worked on the 
labor market tend to be regular and are often explicitly defined in a contract. The problem 
here lies in the fact that this variable is the result of a calculation based upon five different 
variables, and that there are therefore five potential sources of error. 
 
Despite these inaccuracies, I choose to work with PSID data for two reasons. First, to 
my knowledge there is not a better alternative. American Time Use Survey data would be 
preferable because respondents note what they are doing in a diary when they are doing it. 
However, such data is not collected for couples, but only for one spouse per couple. Since I 
model the times spent by each spouse working around the house or on the labor market as the 
outcome of a household decision making process, I need data for both spouses of each couple.  
 
Second, studies on the inaccuracies present in PSID data provide information on the 
sign and magnitude of these biases, and confirm the validity of using survey data to study 
household time allocation. Juster, Ono and Stafford (2003) compare these four PSID variables 
to their diary-based counterparts. Their data shows that for market work, men tend to over-
report hours by more or less 10%, whereas women tend to under-report hours by a similar 
margin.18 For housework, both men and women inflate reports of their hours, women by 
around 40%, and men by 20-100% depending on the year. These results on housework are 
                                                 
18 These results are based upon calculations that I carried out using the data presented in Table B1 of Juster, Ono 
and Stafford (2003), and they actually contradict what is presented in the paper. 
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roughly in line with the rest of the literature on the quality of survey data relative to time-use 
data in the US (Marini & Shelton 1993, Robinson, 1985, Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer & Robinson 
2000). The general conclusion is that despite differences between survey and time-use data, 
survey data provides an ordinal scaling of individuals’ time spent on housework that is useful 
for multivariate analyses of household time allocation (Kan 2006). 
 
In this context of noisy data, it is particularly important to clean the data of outliers. 
Given the multivariate nature of the household time allocation problem, simple univariate or 
bivariate trimming of the dataset is not effective.19 Here cleaning the data means detecting 
outliers in a multivariate point cloud when there are most probably several outliers. 
Intuitively, we need to identify the center of the cloud of observations, measure the distance 
of each observation from this center taking into account the shape of the cloud, and eliminate 
those observations that are ‘too far’ from the center. Rousseeuw and Van Zomeren (1990) 
propose the following robust version of the Mahalanobis distance: 
 
t
iii XTxXCXTxRMD ))(()()((
1 --= -  
 
where ix  is the i
th observation of the dataset X , )(XT is the center of the minimum volume 
ellipsoid estimator covering half of the observations and )(XC  is the sample covariance 
matrix determined by the same ellipsoid.20 The cutoff distance is supplied by the square root 
of the appropriate value of the chi-square statistic.  
 
 I use the lts command in S-Plus to calculate the robust Mahalanobis distances first for 
a reduced version of the dataset containing only the four dependent variables and then for the 
complete version of the dataset containing all of the variables. Both plots clearly reveal the 
presence of a subpopulation (a cluster of observations located beyond the cutoff distance), 
composed of those couples in which the husband is unemployed (see Figures 2a and 2b).  
Even though these couples visibly behave differently from other couples, they are not outliers, 
so I do not want to eliminate them from the sample. Thus, I calculate the robust Mahalanobis 
                                                 
19 Consider the following values for the four endogenous time variables: wife’s housework hours=30, husband’s 
housework hours=15, wife’s market work hours=60, husband’s market work hours=70. Neither of these values 
taken separately would qualify as an outlier, but all of these values taken together define a couple with atypical 
behavior, one that should be qualified as an outlier.   
20 The classical Mahalanobis distance defines T(X) as the arithmetic mean of X and C(X) as the usual sample 
covariance matrix. When these definitions are used the distance measure suffers from the “masking effect” by 
which multiple outliers do not necessarily present a large MDi.  
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distances for the two populations separately, for both the reduced and the complete versions 
of the dataset in both cases, and I eliminate the outliers thus identified (see the observations 
marked in black in Figures 3a to 3d). This leaves me with 1516 observations. 
 
 The last thing that I need to do with these variables is to discretize the continuous 
market work time variables. The idea here is to account for labor market rigidities. When a 
spouse is deciding upon his/her market work contribution, (s)he faces limited options in terms 
of market work hours (Martinez-Granado 2005). So, when the market work time variables are 
on the left-hand side, they will be defined in categorical terms: no-time, part-time, full-time, 
over-time. When a spouse is deciding upon his/her housework contribution, this time 
allocation will be made based upon the exact number of hours dedicated to market work. 
Using the categorical definition of market work time in the housework equations would be 
wasting useful information. So, when the market work time variables are on the right-hand 
side, they will be defined in continuous terms. 
 
 Since the idea is to account for labor market reality, I use the empirical distribution of 
the population across the continuous market work time variables to guide the discretization of 
these variables. These distributions are presented in Figures 1a and 1c. Both distributions 
reveal a highly rigid labor market, but wives seem to benefit from more options in terms of 
market work hours than husbands do. Husbands seem to face a choice between full-time and 
over-time jobs, and wives between no-time, part-time, full-time and over-time jobs, so I 
define the following market work dummies: 
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Only job4 is relevant to the husbands, whereas the whole set of dummies is relevant to the 
wives. 
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5.2   Power: a   
 
 I use multiple measures of the intra-spousal distribution of power in order to capture as 
many aspects as possible of the very wide view of power that I have taken. The intra-spousal 
distribution of power is defined as an index in the following manner:  
 
husbandwife
wife
wife powerpower
power
indexpower
+
=  
 
This index varies from 0 to 1, 0 representing no power for the wife and total power for the 
husband, and 1 representing total power for the wife and no power for the husband. 0.5 
represents equality between the two spouses.  
 
I use four measures of power: age, education, wage and sex ratios. Age is measured in 
years. Education is the actual grade of school completed. 17 is the maximum value of the 
education variable and indicates that the individual has undertaken at least some postgraduate 
work. Wage is the average hourly remuneration in dollars (i.e. taking into account different 
wages for different jobs and extra bonuses paid in addition to the usual hourly rate of pay). 
The sex ratio for the wife is the ratio between the number of men and women residing within 
the same state and having the same age plus or minus 5 years. Note that I include married 
people in my definition of the remarriage market. Indeed, if I am talking about remarriage, 
then marriage is not binding, and if marriage is not binding then the remarriage market must 
include married people. The sex ratio for the husband is defined in the equivalent manner. 
The data used to calculate the sex ratios comes from Census data for 2001. 
 
 In order to allow for a maximum of flexibility in the modelling of the relationship 
between the dependent variables and these four power indexes (i.e. to allow for the possibility 
of different slopes), I transform each power index into a dummy variable with three possible 
values: husband is (relatively) more powerful, spouses share power (relatively) equally, and 
wife is (relatively) more powerful. Theoretically, all four indexes should be discretized in the 
same manner, using 0.5 as representative of equality. However, three related empirical 
considerations lead me to adapt this theoretical approach. First, the value of 0.5 representing 
exact equality is only practically feasible for the discrete variables, the age and education 
indexes. An interval including 0.5 would be more appropriate for the continuous variables, the 
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wage and sex ratio indexes. Second, from the point of view of inference, it would be 
preferable to have a minimum number of observations for each of the three values. Third, the 
intervals need to be wide enough in order to identify groups with distinguishably different 
behaviours. Indeed, will a spouse with an observed power value of 0.51 really behave 
differently from one with a value of 0.50 and one with a value of 0.49?  
 
These three considerations lead me to discretize the four indexes in the following way. 
The education index is discretized as theoretically desired, using 0.5 to represent equality (see 
Figure 4b): 
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The age and sex ratio indexes are discretized by defining an interval that is roughly centered 
upon 0.5 to represent equality (0.48-0.51 for the age index and 0.46-0.51 for the sex ratio 
index, see Figures 4a and 4c):  
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The wage ratio index is discretized by defining an interval including, but not centered upon, 
0.5 in order to reflect the considerable skew in the distribution of the population across this 
index: 0.29-0.51 (see Figure 4d)21: 
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Each of these discretizations splits the population into groups containing roughly the same 
numbers of observations. 
 
 It is important to note that these four measures of power do indeed capture four very 
different aspects of power. The correlation matrix is presented below: 
 
00.107.019.002.0
00.114.005.0
00.100.0
00.1
-
-
powerwage
powersex
powereducation
powerage
powerwagepowersexpowereducationpowerage
 
  
These correlations are very low. The highest correlation is only 0.19 and occurs between the 
education and wage power variables. These low correlations might be surprising at first 
glance, but do not forget that these are the correlations between the power indices which are 
not to be confused with the correlations between the underlying variables that do indeed 
present higher levels of correlation. For example, for the underlying education and wage 
variables, the correlation matrix is: 
 
                                                 
21 The following more symetrical discretization was also tried, but it does not yield results that are statistically 
significant: age ratio index (0.49-0.51), sex ratio index (0.49-0.51), and wage ratio index (0.35-0.51). These 
results led to the third consideration presented above (i.e. the intervals need to be wide enough in order to 
identify groups with distinguishably different behaviours) and to the final discretization also presented above. 
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00.143.018.032.0
00.123.058.0
00.135.0
00.1
husbandwage
husbandeducation
wifewage
wifeeducation
husbandwagehusbandeducationwifewagewifeeducation
 
 
Here the lowest correlation is 0.18 and occurs between the wages within couples. All that this 
tells us is that although education and wages are correlated for couples, these correlations are 
not proportionate. Education within couples can be highly correlated and wages within 
couples can be highly correlated, but this does not necessarily imply that the difference in 
education within couples is correlated to the same degree with the difference in wages within 
couples. The advantage of this lack of correlation between the power indices is that 
multicollinearity will not be a problem for the precise estimation of the individual coefficients 
of these variables. 
 
5.3   Individual and couple characteristics variables: bgg  and , wh  
 
 Table 1 presents all of the control variables along with their definitions. In general, I 
use an expanded vector of control variables in the instrumenting regressions and a reduced 
vector of control variables in the subsequent regressions. The point of interest in the 
instrumenting regressions is the fitted values, and not the estimated coefficients. This implies 
that multicollinearity is not a problem and that I should include the most flexible specification 
possible.  
 
For the individual characteristics γh and γw, I distinguish between personal and labor 
market characteristics. Personal characteristics are measured using age, education, race, 
religion, and health variables. Labor market characteristics are measured using work 
experience, occupation, and industry for the supply-side, and using the unemployment rate 
and geographic location for the demand-side. For the couple characteristics β, I use the 
number and age of children and other dependents, and the number of rooms and cars.  
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5.4   Wage and income variables: yyyww whwh  and ,,,  
 
Table 1 also presents the wage and income variables along with their definitions. The 
variable wealth represents y as the net value of the couple’s assets, excluding the value of 
home equity. The variable other hh income represents yh and yw as the sum of non-labor 
income for the couple and labor income for the spouse; this represents the income available to 
the couple if the individual were to choose not to do any market work. The variable lwagehat 
represents wh and wf as the log of estimated hourly wages earned by the individual. Since 
wages are not observed for those individuals who do not do any market work, I need to use 
the information contained in observed wages to calculate estimated wages for those 
individuals without observed wages. I do this using the two-stage Heckman procedure.22 
 
 The two-stage Heckman procedure consists in the estimation first of a participation 
equation using the entire sample, and then of a wage equation using the part of the sample for 
which wages are observed.  The inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated using the results from the 
first stage and is included as a regressor in the second stage to correct for sample selection 
bias. The selection regression includes all variables that could potentially contribute to 
explaining why an individual chooses to do or not to do any market work. These variables 
include personal and spousal characteristics (age, education, race, religion, health), couple 
characteristics (number and age of children and other dependants, other household income), 
and labor market conditions (unemployment rate). The wage regression includes all variables 
that could potentially affect the wage that an individual earns on the labor market. These 
variables include personal characteristics (age, education, race, health, learning disability), 
couple characteristics (number and age of children), and labor market considerations (work 
experience, occupation, industry, geographic location). 
 
 The results of the two-stage Heckman procedure are presented in Table 2. The only 
observation of particular interest is that whereas the coefficient of the sample selection 
correction term is significantly different from zero in the wife’s wage equation, it is not in the 
husband’s wage equation. This result confirms the accepted wisdom in the labor market 
                                                 
22 I could alternatively restrict the sample to couples in which both spouses earn wages, but since I would like to 
understand the mechanisms underlying the different time allocation outcomes, I cannot just eliminate one 
particularly interesting time allocation outcome from the sample under study.  
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literature and just reflects the greater selection operating upon the labor market for women 
than for men. 
 
5.5   Other control variable 
 
In order to control for any systematic misreporting of the spouses’ behavior, I include 
a dummy that is equal to one if the respondent to the 2001 PSID interview was the wife. 
 
6. Empirical findings and Discussion 
 
 Estimation of the time allocation model is carried out in two stages. In order to 
account for the survey design of the data, observations are weighted using sampling weights 
and standard errors are corrected for clustering across strata and sampling units. This is 
achieved using the svy commands in STATA and defining pweights, strata and psu. 
 
In the first stage, I instrument the four endogenous time variables and generate fitted 
values (see Table 3). In the second stage, I estimate the set of four simultaneous equations 
using an equation-by-equation method. I take this approach for two reasons. First, when using 
the alternate systems method, any specification error made in one equation contaminates the 
results for all of the other equations. Given the noisy data that I am working with, I want to 
minimize all other possible sources of error. Second, the fact that the dependant variables are 
continuous, binary, and ordinal, implies that classical systems methods are not applicable.   
 
The housework equations are estimated using OLS, and the market work equations are 
estimated using ordered probit. This means that the marginal effects of the independent 
variables upon housework hours remain constant across observations, and therefore are 
straightforward to summarize. This also means that the marginal effects of the independent 
variables upon market work hours vary across observations, and therefore need to be 
evaluated for a representative couple. So, I need to identify the median couple, as defined in 
terms of the four time allocation variables.   
 
Defining the median couple using the median values of the four time variables does 
not necessarily give us what we need. First, the wife with the median housework hours is not 
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necessarily the wife with the median market work hours. Second, even if this did indeed 
happen to be the case, the same would have to hold true for the husband, and these median 
spouses would have to be married to one another. So, once again I need to locate the center of 
a four-dimensional cloud of observations. I define the median couple by calculating the 
median values of the four time variables for the 118 couples of the main population associated 
with a robust mahalanobis distance of less than one. The median couple has a wife who works 
40 hours out of the home and 15 hours in the home, and a husband who works 48 hours out of 
the home and 6 hours in the home. 
 
6.1 Time allocation process 
 
 Three aspects of the results on the household time allocation process stand out. The 
first aspect is the symmetry between the husband and the wife in the magnitudes of the 
estimated coefficients in their market work and housework equations. The second aspect is 
the asymmetry in the statistical significance of these coefficients. The third aspect is the 
statistical significance of respondent only in the husband’s housework regression. I will 
discuss each of these results in turn. 
 
6.1.1   Housework behavior 
 
 The estimation results of the housework equations for the husband and wife are 
summarized in the first two columns of Table 4 (see Table 5 for the full results). The 
estimated coefficients are expressed in minutes.  
 
· The more market work one does, the less housework one does. An hour more of 
market work means 8 minutes less housework for the wife and 5 minutes less 
housework for the husband.  
 
· The more market work one does, the more housework the spouse does. An hour more 
of the spouse’s market work means 4 minutes more housework for both the husband 
and the wife alike.  
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· The more housework the spouse does, the more housework one does. An hour more of 
the spouse’s housework means 7 minutes more housework for the wife and 12 minutes 
more for the husband.  
 
These results attest to a striking symmetry in the way both spouses adjust their housework 
time in reaction to their own market work decisions and the other’s housework and market 
work decisions. The asymmetry between the spouses’ housework behavior lies in the 
statistical significance of one spouse’s reaction to the other spouse’s housework. Whereas the 
7 minutes for the wife is not statistically different from zero, the 12 minutes for the husband is 
statistically different from zero.  
 
6.1.2   Labor market behavior 
 
 The estimation results of the market work equations for the husband and wife are 
summarized in the last two columns of Table 4 (see Table 5 for the full results). The estimated 
coefficients are expressed in probabilities.  
 
· The more housework one does, the higher the probability that one works shorter hours 
and the lower the probability that one works longer hours. An hour more of 
housework for the wife means 3% more chance that the wife does not work, 4% more 
chance that she works part-time, 1% less chance that she works fulltime and 6% less 
chance that she works overtime. An hour more of housework for the husband means 
1% more chance that the husband works fulltime and 1% less chance that he works 
overtime.  
 
· The more housework the spouse does, the lower the probability that one works shorter 
hours and the higher the probability that one works longer hours. An hour more of 
housework for the husband means 1% less chance that the wife does not work, 2% less 
chance that she works part-time, 1% more chance that she works fulltime and 2% 
more chance that she works overtime. An hour more of housework for the wife means 
1% less chance that the husband works fulltime and 1% more chance that he works 
overtime.  
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· The more market work the wife does, the higher the probability (+1%) that the 
husband works shorter hours and the lower the probability (-1%) that he works longer 
hours. The husband’s market work has no effect upon the wife’s market work.  
 
These results also reveal some symmetry in the way both spouses adjust their market work 
time in reaction to their own housework decisions and the other’s housework and market 
work decisions. The asymmetry between the spouses’ market work behavior lies in the 
statistical significance of their reactions to the housework variables and to the market work 
variables. While only the housework variables are significantly taken into account by the wife 
in her market work decision, only the market work variable is significantly taken into account 
by the husband in his market work decision. 
 
6.1.3   Time allocation behavior 
 
 Putting the results from the market work and the housework equations together, we 
can draw the following profiles of the wife’s and the husband’s time allocation processes. The 
husband first decides upon his market work, taking his wife’s market work decision into 
account, but only marginally. He then decides upon his housework taking everything (i.e. his 
and her market work and her housework) into account. So, the husband’s behavior confirms 
the sociological approach to time allocation in which the market work decision is causally 
prior to the housework decision. The wife decides upon her market work taking housework 
into account, and decides upon her housework taking market work into account. So, the 
wife’s behavior confirms the economic approach to time allocation in which market work and 
housework are simultaneously determined. 
 
 The last thing that needs to be discussed in relation to the basic time allocation model 
is the statistical significance of respondent only in the husband’s housework regression. This 
result means that on average couples agreed upon the magnitude of each spouse’s 
contributions in the two spheres, except for the husband’s contribution to housework. When 
wives report their husbands’ housework hours, they report 154 minutes less on average than 
when husbands’ report their own housework hours. The question that naturally arises is 
whether it is the wives who are underreporting their husbands’ housework hours or the other 
way around. Achen and Stafford (2005) study this issue but the results are inconclusive. The 
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relevance of this result for this paper is that it very clearly indicates that the magnitude of the 
husband’s contribution to housework is a source of disagreement within couples.  
 
Can we go so far as to say that the wife’s perception of her husband’s contribution to 
the housework constrains her market work decision? Well, the results show that the more 
housework the husband does, the lower the chance that the wife works shorter hours and the 
higher the chance that the wife works longer hours. But if the husband does more housework 
then the wife will also do more housework (husband’s and wife’s housework are 
complements!) and this extra housework for the wife works in the opposite direction, 
increasing the chance that the wife works shorter hours and decreasing the chance that the 
wife works longer hours. The net impact of the husband’s increased contribution to 
housework upon the wife’s market work remains positive, but small. 
 
6.2 Power variables  
 
 Once again the results highlight both symmetries and asymmetries between the 
spouses. The results suggest that spouses share a similar vision of the ideal balance between 
the home and the market, but because their starting points are so different, each spouse needs 
to move in opposite directions to get there. Not only do husbands and wives differ in how 
they use their power, they also differ in the sources from which they derive power. Wives 
derive power from education and wages and use that power to exchange housework hours for 
market work hours. Husbands derive power from sex ratios and use that power to exchange 
market work hours for housework hours. It would seem that the ideal place to be lies 
somewhere in between the wife’s and the husband’s current positions.  
 
6.2.1   Housework behavior 
 
 The estimation results for the power variables in the housework equations are 
summarized in the first two columns of Table 4 (see Table 5 for the full results). I have three 
comments to make on these results. First, the estimated coefficients for the husbands and 
wives are of opposing signs for all but one of the power variables. Note that only 3 of these 16 
estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero; nevertheless, the fact remains that 
on average husbands and wives use their power to move in opposite directions.  
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Second, in the regression for wives, the only power variable with an estimated 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero is the dummy for low wage power. Wives 
who earn wages that are lower than those earned by their husbands have to contribute 99 more 
minutes to housework than the same wives married to husbands with lower wages. So, wives 
use wage power to buy less hours of housework.  
 
Third, in the regression for husbands, two of the power variables have estimated 
coefficients that are significantly different from zero, and both coefficients tell the same story 
that men use wage and remarriage power to buy more hours of housework. Low wage power 
is associated with 35 minutes less of housework and high remarriage power with 78 more 
minutes of housework. One possible explanation for this potentially perplexing result is that 
husbands and wives interpret the housework question differently, husbands including at least 
some childcare hours that wives do not include. This explanation provides the additional 
advantage of accounting for the 154 minutes difference in the husbands’ and wives’ reports of 
husbands’ housework hours. In this case, the results would be indicating that men use their 
power to buy more time at home caring for their children. 
 
6.2.2   Labor market behavior 
 
The estimation results for the power variables in the market work equations are 
summarized in the last two columns of Table 4 (see Table 5 for the full results). In the 
regression for wives, two of the power variables have estimated coefficients that are 
significantly different from zero, and both coefficients tell the same story that wives use 
education and wage power to buy more hours of market work. Low education and wage 
power increase the probabilities of doing no or part-time market work and decrease the 
probabilities of doing fulltime or overtime market work. Low education power shifts 7% from 
the probabilities of working fulltime or more to the probabilities of working part-time or less. 
Low wage power shifts 22% in the same direction. Since wages are correlated with education, 
I would expect these effects to be often cumulated. What is fundamental about this result is 
that power can alter the effective labor supply of wives. I return to the example mentioned in 
the introduction. A ‘typical’ wife with 4 years of college education and an average wage, who 
is living with a husband with less education and a lower wage, has 14% less chance of 
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working part-time and 11% more chance of working full-time when compared to the same 
woman who is living with a man with more education and a higher wage. So this same wife 
will most probably work full-time when she is in the more powerful situation with respect to 
her spouse, and part-time when she is in the less powerful situation.  
 
In the regression for husbands, the only power variable with an estimated coefficient 
that is significantly different from zero is the dummy for high remarriage power. An increased 
concentration of women in the population is accompanied by an increased probability of 
working shorter hours. High remarriage power shifts 10% from the probability of working 
overtime to the probability of working fulltime. This result means that a husband who is 
living in a state where 50% of the population in his age-bracket is female has 10% less chance 
of working 40-45 hours a week and 10% more chance of working more than 45 hours a week, 
when compared to the same man living in a state where 51% of the population in his age-
bracket is female. This result suggests that power can alter the effective labor supply of 
husbands. A husband will most probably have a ‘small’ full-time job when he is in the more 
powerful situation with respect to his partner, and a ‘big’ full-time job when he is in the less 
powerful situation. 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
 Why are women less active than men on the labor market? Or alternatively, why are 
men more active than women on the labor market? Is it nature or nurture, choice or 
constraint? My results show that when wives benefit from relatively more power, defined in 
education and wage terms, they use this power to exchange housework hours for market work 
hours. (This result is compatible with the specialization and trade story.) When men benefit 
from relatively more power, defined in sex ratio terms, they use this power to exchange 
market work hours for housework hours. (This result is not compatible with the specialization 
and trade story.) So, the answer to the question would have to be « nurture » or « constraint ». 
Husbands and wives that are trapped in less powerful positions are constrained to choose sub-
optimal levels of labor force participation. These results highlight two issues. 
 
 First, it would seem that men and women are more similar in their preferences on the 
work-family trade-off than the labor market statistics reveal. Women do less market work and 
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more housework than husbands, but they would like to do more market work and less 
housework. Men do more market work and less housework than women, but they would like 
to do less market work and more housework. Men and women seem to agree that the ideal 
place to be is somewhere in between. 
 
Second, the fact that what constitutes power is different for different people is 
fundamental to fully understanding the outcomes of intra-spousal bargaining. Indeed, both 
spouses of the same couple could simultaneously each feel less powerful than the other, the 
wife because she has less years of education and earns a lower wage than her husband, the 
husband because he faces a remarriage market with a relatively low concentration of women. 
This would generate a sub-optimal time allocation outcome for both of them, the wife 
working less than she would like to, and the husband working more than he would like to. 
This multi-dimensional aspect of the intra-spousal distribution of power appears to be a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
 To conclude, this paper presents some evidence that cannot be reconciled with the 
classical specialization and trade story. The power story provides an alternative explanation of 
the data that poses some very tough social questions. Why do women work the hours that they 
do? Why do men work the hours that they do? Because they want to or because they have to? 
Depending on the answers to these questions, there could be profound implications for public 
policy. The riddle is far from resolved. Despite much debate in the press, less has taken place 
in the economics literature. Such a passionate debate would benefit from more econometric 
rigor. I hope to have contributed in such a manner.   
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Figure 1: Husbands' and wives' weekly housework and market work hours
(Note: Histograms are constructed using 2001 PSID data for cohabiting couples.)
a) Histogram of wives' weekly market work hours
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b) Histogram of wives' weekly housework hours
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d) Histogram of husbands' weekly housework hours
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Figure 2: Distribution of robust mahalanobis distances for entire population
(Notes: Calculations of robust distances are based on 2001 PSID data for cohabiting couples. The presence of a sub-population composed of 
couples in which the husbands do not do any market work is revealed by the cluster of observations located at RMD=5.5 in graph a and RMD=22 
in graph b. The dependent variables are husbands' and wives' time spent on market and housework per week. All variables also include each 
spouses' age, education, work experience, full-time work experience, work weeks, and wage, and the couples' number of children.)
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Figure 3: Distribution of mahalanobis robust distances for the main and the sub-populations
(Notes: Outlying observations that were eliminated from the sample are marked in black. Calculations of robust distances are based on 2001 PSID data for cohabiting couples. The main population is composed of 
couples in which the husband works a positive number of hours on the labor market weekly. The sub-population is composed of couples in which the husband does not do any market work. The dependent variables are 
husbands' and wives' time spent on market and housework per week. All variables also include each spouses' age, education, work experience, full-time work experience, work weeks, and wage, and the couples' number 
of children.)
a) Robust distances for main population
(calculations based on dependent variables)
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Robust mahalanobis distance
D
en
si
ty
b) Robust distances for main population
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c) Robust distances for sub-population 
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Figure 4: Power distribution within couples
(Notes: Histograms are constructed using 2001 PSID data for cohabiting couples. Power is an index measuring the wife's contribution to the couple's resources in age, education, wages and sex ratios. This index varies 
from 0 to 1, 0 representing no power for the wife, 1 total power for the wife, and 0.5 equality between the two spouses. The discretization used in the empirical analysis is indicated by the colors of the bars, white 
indicating more power for the huband, grey equal power between the spouses, and black more power for the wife.)
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c) Sex-power distribution within couples
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Sex-power index
D
en
si
ty
d) Wage-power distribution within couples
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Table 1: Definitions of control variables
Variable Definition in general terms
Husband Wife
Personal characteristics of the individual
Age variables
age ER17013-mean(ER17013) ER17015-mean(ER17015) Age in years, centered upon mean
age2 age2 age2 Age, centered and squared
age3 age3 age3 Age, centered and cubed
Education variables
education UPEDU01H-mean(UPEDU01H) UPEDU01W-mean(UPEDU01W) Education in years, centered upon mean
education2 education2 education2 Education, centered and squared
education3 education3 education3 Education, centered and cubed
edudummy2 UPEDU01H=12-15 UPEDU01W=12-15 Dummy equal to one for individuals with 12-15 years of education
edudummy3 UPEDU01H=16-17 UPEDU01W=16-17 Dummy equal to one for individuals with 16-17 years of education
Age - Education interaction terms
age*edu age*education age*education Age multiplied by years of education
age*edu2 age*education2 age*education2 Age multiplied by education squared
age2*edu age2*education age2*education Age squared multiplied by education
age*edu3 age*education3 age*education3 Age multiplied by education cubed
age3*edu age3*education age3*education Age cubed multiplied by education
Race dummies 
race1 ER19989=1 ER19897=1 The base category is composed of individuals of white race.
race2 ER19989=2 ER19897=2 Dummy equal to one for individual of black race
race3 ER19989=3-7 ER19897=3-7 Dummy equal to one for individual of other races
Continued on the next page
Definition in terms of PSID references
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Definition in general terms
Husband Wife
Personal characteristics of the individual (continued)
Religion dummies ER20038 updated using ER15977, 
ER11895, ER9099, ER6853, ER3983 
& V23315.
ER19945 updated using ER15884, 
ER11807, ER9029, ER6783, ER3913 
& V23242.
religion1 ER20038updated=3-9 ER19945updated=3-9 The base category is composed of individuals of protestant religion.
religion2 ER20038updated=1, 13 ER19945updated=1, 13 Dummy equal to one for individuals of catholic religion
religion3 ER20038updated=11-12, 14-25 ER19945updated=11-12, 14-25 Dummy equal to one for individuals of restorationist religions
religion4 ER20038updated=2 ER19945updated=2 Dummy equal to one for individuals of jewish religion
religion5 ER20038updated=10, 97 ER19945updated=10, 97 Dummy equal to one for individuals of other religions
religion6 ER20038updated=0 ER19945updated=0 Dummy equal to one for atheists or agnostics
Other variables
bad health ER19612=4-5 ER19720=4-5 Dummy equal to one for individuals claiming to be in bad health
learning disability ER19683=1 ER19791=1 Dummy equal to one for individuals claiming to have a learning disability
Labor market characteristics of the individual 
Occupation 
dummies 
HDOCC01 updated using:  
HDOCC99, HDOCC97, HDOCC96, 
HDOCC95, HDOCC94 & V22456.
WFOCC01 updated using: 
WFOCC99, WFOCC97, WFOCC96, 
WFOCC95, WFOCC94 & V22809.
occupation1 HDOCC01updated=1-195 WFOCC01updated=1-195 The base category is composed of professional, technical and kindred workers.
occupation2 HDOCC01updated=201-245 WFOCC01updated=201-245 Dummy equal to one for managers and administrators, except farm.
occupation3 HDOCC01updated=401-600 WFOCC01updated=301-395 Wives: Dummy equal to one for clerical and kindred workers. Husbands: Dummy 
equal to one for craftsmen and kindred workers.
occupation4 HDOCC01updated=601-695 WFOCC01updated=901-965 Wives: Dummy equal to one for service workers, except private household. 
Husbands: Dummy equal to one for operatives, except transport.
occupation5 HDOCC01updated=other values WFOCC01updated=other values Dummy equal to one for other occupations, including no occupation
Continued on the next page
Definition in terms of PSID references
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Definition in general terms
Husband Wife
Labor market characteristics of the individual (continued)
Industry dummies HDIND01 updated using:      
HDIND99, HDIND97, HDIND96, 
HDIND95, HDIND94 & V22457.
WFIND01 updated using:     
WFIND99, WFIND97, WFIND96, 
WFIND95, WFIND94 & V22810.
industry1 HDIND01updated=107-398 WFIND01updated=107-398 The base category is composed of individuals with job in manufacturing sector.
industry2 HDIND01updated=407-479 WFIND01updated=407-479 Dummy equal to one for individual with job in transportation, communications and 
other public utilities sectors.
industry3 HDIND01updated=507-698 WFIND01updated=507-698 Dummy equal to one for individual with job in wholesale and retail trade sectors.
industry4 HDIND01updated=828-897 WFIND01updated=828-897 Dummy equal to one for individual with job in professional and related services.
industry5 HDIND01updated=other values WFIND01updated=other values Dummy equal to one for individual with job in other industries, including no 
industry.
Other variables
work experience ER20040 updated using:       
ER15979, ER11897, ER9101, 
ER6855, ER3985 & V23316.
ER19947 updated using:       
ER15886, ER11809, ER9031, 
ER6785, ER3915 & V23243.
Number of years worked since 18 years of age.
ft work experience ER20041 updated using:       
ER15980, ER11898, ER9102, 
ER6856, ER3986 & V23317.
ER19948 updated using:       
ER15887, ER11810, ER9032, 
ER6786, ER3916 & V23244.
Number of years worked full-time since 18 years of age.
work weeks HDWKS01 WFWKS01 Number of weeks worked during 2001
weeksdummy2 HDWKS03=31-47 WFWKS01=31-47 Dummy equal to one for individual who worked between 31 and 48 weeks in 2001.
weeksdummy3 HDWKS04=48-52 WFWKS01=48-52 Dummy equal to one for individual who worked more than 48 weeks in 2001.
log wage log(HDWGE01) log(WFWGE01) Log of hourly wages
non-labor income ER18634 + ER18650 + ER18666 + 
ER18682 + ER18847 + ER18863 
ER18966 + ER18982 + ER18998 + 
ER19014 + ER19063 + ER19143
Non-labor income for the individual in 2001
other hh income couple's non-labor income + 
WFEARN01
couple's non-labor income + 
HDEARN01
Sum of non-labor income for the couple and labor income for the spouse in 2001
Continued on the next page
Definition in terms of PSID references
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable Definition in terms of PSID references Definition in general terms
Couple
Other variables (continued)
beale1 - beale10 ER20377=1 - ER20377=10 10 dummies for the ten values taken by the Beale-Ross rural-urban continuum code for 2001 residence, 
ranging from central counties of metropolitan areas of 1 million population or more (beale1=1) to completely 
rural, not adjacent to a metropolitan area (beale=10)
unemployment rate Census data Rate of unemployment for state of residence in 2001
Characteristics of the couple
Children dummies The base category is composed of couples with no children.
child1 ER17016=1 Dummy equal to one for couples with one child
child2 ER17016=2 Dummy equal to one for couple with two children
child3 ER17016>2 Dummy equal to one for couples with more than than two children
youngchild ER17017<6 Dummy equal to one for couples with a child that is younger than 6 years old
Other variables
add hh members ER17018 Number of additional household members not belonging to the immediate family
rooms ER17040 Number of rooms for the household, not including bathrooms
cars ER17111 Number of cars owned or leased by the household
wealth S516 Net value of couple's assets, excluding value of home equity
respondent ER17019 Dummy equal to one if the respondent to the 2001 PSID interview is the wife
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Table 2: Heckman two-stage procedure
Participation equations Wage equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Personal characteristics of the individual
age 0.013 0.016 -0.001 0.010
(0.73) (0.52) (-0.15) (2.39)
age2 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(-1.24) (0.27) (-2.75) (-2.84)
age3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.36) (-0.85) (0.92) (2.57)
education 0.048 0.173 0.070 0.083
(0.78) (1.79) (4.28) (5.49)
education2 -0.010 -0.037 0.004 0.002
(-0.87) (-1.15) (0.84) (0.51)
education3 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001
(0.56) (-1.15) (-0.77) (-1.05)
age*edu 0.019 0.012 -0.002 -0.004
(2.67) (1.11) (-0.61) (-1.92)
age*edu2 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000
(-0.84) (-1.38) (-0.78) (0.64)
age2*edu 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.07) (1.40) (-0.46) (0.55)
age*edu3 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(-1.20) (-1.48) (1.22) (1.17)
age3*edu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-2.91) (-0.22) (0.18) (1.00)
race2 -0.566 -0.311 -0.084 -0.197
(-1.37) (-1.14) (-1.66) (-4.20)
race3 0.241 -0.088 0.068 -0.235
(0.92) (-0.24) (0.56) (-2.44)
learning disability _       _       0.068 0.030
(1.52) (0.88)
bad health -0.791 -1.165 0.074 -0.225
(-5.78) (-4.90) (1.18) (-3.57)
religion2 -0.021 0.088 _       _       
(-0.15) (0.31)
religion3 -0.023 0.285 _       _       
(-0.10) (0.42)
religion4 0.190 5.288 _       _       
(0.67) (11.53)
religion5 -0.203 -0.049 _       _       
(-0.64) (-0.11)
religion6 0.319 0.486 _       _       
(1.72) (1.50)
Continued on the next page
Part II. Chapter 3. Nature vs Nurture: An Empirical Analysis of the Division of Labor within American Couples. 
 135 
Table 2 (continued)
Participation equations Wage equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Labor market characteristics of the individual
occupation2 _       _       -0.082 0.049
(-1.65) (1.13)
occupation3 _       _       -0.215 -0.143
(-5.27) (-2.84)
occupation4 _       _       -0.361 -0.156
(-5.01) (-2.41)
occupation5 _       _       -0.318 -0.259
(-4.61) (-5.39)
industry2 _       _       0.009 -0.028
(0.15) (-0.67)
industry3 _       _       -0.234 -0.229
(-2.47) (-5.46)
industry4 _       _       -0.081 -0.254
(-1.62) (-4.07)
industry5 _       _       -0.047 -0.116
(-1.01) (-6.39)
beale2 _       _       0.041 0.037
(0.95) (0.81)
beale3 _       _       -0.096 -0.128
(-2.13) (-3.05)
beale4 _       _       -0.235 -0.204
(-3.29) (-3.82)
beale5 _       _       -0.121 -0.245
(-1.72) (-3.70)
beale6 _       _       -0.145 -0.203
(-2.1) (-2.47)
beale7 _       _       -0.316 -0.252
(-5.24) (-4.04)
beale8 _       _       -0.396 -0.385
(-6.93) (-4.58)
beale9 _       _       -0.157 -0.319
(-1.77) (-2.11)
beale10 _       _       -0.453 -0.513
(-4.98) (-4.97)
work experience _       _       0.009 -0.020
(1.54) (-2.79)
ft work experience _       _       0.008 0.004
(1.57) (0.64)
unemployment rate -0.473 -0.156 _       _       
(-0.11) (-0.02)
Continued on the next page  
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Table 2 (continued)
Participation equations Wage equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Characteristics of the spouse
race2 1.179 -0.225 _       _       
(3.01) (-0.94)
race3 0.047 -0.353 _       _       
(0.14) (-1.03)
bad health 0.035 0.051 _       _       
(0.19) (0.18)
religion2 0.069 -0.296 _       _       
(0.54) (-1.15)
religion3 0.063 -0.386 _       _       
(0.27) (-0.63)
religion4 0.405 4.646 _       _       
(1.88) (10.16)
religion5 -0.200 -0.085 _       _       
(-0.53) (-0.19)
religion6 -0.087 0.132 _       _       
(-0.70) (0.39)
Characteristics of the couple
child1 -0.211 0.961 -0.016 0.039
(-1.56) (3.28) (-0.36) (1.12)
child2 -0.300 0.750 -0.046 0.033
(-2.08) (3.14) (-1.06) (0.81)
child3 -0.437 0.219 -0.108 0.068
(-2.67) (0.69) (-1.58) (1.51)
youngchild -0.217 -0.029 0.186 0.057
(-1.85) (-0.10) (3.56) (1.74)
add hh members -0.104 -0.071 _       _       
(-0.72) (-0.18)
other hh income 0.000 0.000 _       _       
(-1.75) (-2.46)
wealth 0.000 0.000 _       _       
(-0.34) (-1.11)
inverse mill's ratio _       _       -1.098 0.228
(-5.62) (0.87)
constant 1.401 2.329 2.516 3.563
(4.99) (3.36) (10.03) (17.39)
(pseudo) R 2 0.088 0.298 0.377 0.389
Notes: The results are OLS estimations. Observations are weighted using sampling 
weights. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering across strata and sampling units. 
The t-statistics are in the brackets.  
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Table 3: Instrumenting regressions for house and market work variables
Housework equations Market work equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Personal characteristics of the individual
age 0.132 -0.083 -0.043 0.045
(1.68) (-1.72) (-0.24) (0.30)
age2 -0.001 -0.007 0.005 0.002
(-0.23) (-3.14) (0.93) (0.43)
age3 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(1.01) (-0.53) (-1.87) (0.33)
education -0.755 0.215 0.483 0.906
(-1.8) (1.68) (1.38) (2.28)
education2 0.034 -0.026 0.017 0.019
(0.34) (-0.59) (0.14) (0.23)
education3 0.018 -0.006 -0.036 0.003
(0.67) (-0.55) (-1.20) (0.11)
age*edu -0.045 -0.029 0.054 -0.074
(-1.17) (-1.5) (0.97) (-1.44)
age*edu2 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.000
(0.01) (2.23) (1.58) (0.01)
age2*edu 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.05) (-0.32) (0.82) (-0.52)
age*edu3 -0.001 0.002 0.009 0.003
(-0.56) (2.04) (2.34) (0.82)
age3*edu 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.46) (0.8) (-3.35) (1.51)
race2 -4.906 2.046 -1.703 0.131
(-2.75) (1.85) (-0.50) (0.05)
race3 -2.808 0.244 0.516 1.743
(-1.8) (0.49) (0.28) (0.72)
religion2 -0.261 -0.048 -0.710 0.364
(-0.37) (-0.17) (-0.63) (0.62)
religion3 -1.013 -0.058 0.405 -0.318
(-0.85) (-0.07) (0.24) (-0.16)
religion4 -1.045 -0.708 1.483 2.188
(-0.68) (-0.67) (0.47) (1.76)
religion5 0.289 -1.301 -0.995 -1.983
(0.19) (-1.48) (-0.53) (-0.7)
religion6 -1.960 0.312 0.525 -0.247
(-2.07) (0.52) (0.36) (-0.21)
Labor market characteristics of the individual
occupation2 -0.700 -1.040 2.146 1.738
(-0.82) (-1.64) (2.19) (2.13)
occupation3 1.132 0.238 -1.774 1.231
(1.5) (0.35) (-1.90) (1.35)
occupation4 1.100 -0.691 -3.365 -1.391
(0.87) (-0.73) (-2.20) (-1.74)
occupation5 1.240 -0.106 -3.734 0.847
(1.06) (-0.15) (-3.54) (0.86)
Continued on the next page
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Table 3 (continued)
Housework equations Market work equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Labor market characteristics of the individual (continued)
industry2 -1.337 -0.694 -0.751 2.384
(-0.76) (-1.21) (-0.45) (2.27)
industry3 3.650 -0.645 -1.411 1.596
(4.21) (-1.12) (-1.25) (1.70)
industry4 1.011 -0.369 -2.430 -0.296
(0.92) (-0.46) (-2.48) (-0.35)
industry5 1.999 -1.231 -2.959 0.811
(2.11) (-2.58) (-3.68) (1.12)
work weeks -0.203 -0.057 0.608 0.843
(-11.85) (-3.46) (28.22) (30.53)
work experience _       _       -0.472 -0.197
(-4.13) (-0.93)
ft work experience _       _       0.842 0.302
(8.23) (1.60)
unemployment rate -18.212 1.891 -33.481 -56.932
(-0.76) (0.09) (-1.02) (-2.00)
Characteristics of the spouse
race2 1.739 -1.774 3.333 -0.860
(0.91) (-1.74) (0.97) (-0.30)
race3 0.064 0.484 0.485 0.181
(0.05) (0.59) (0.31) (0.08)
religion2 1.133 0.095 -0.620 0.108
(1.67) (0.24) (-0.85) (0.11)
religion3 2.304 -0.425 -1.662 1.146
(1.22) (-0.58) (-0.85) (0.67)
religion4 -2.434 -0.090 -1.943 -1.105
(-1.37) (-0.09) (-0.74) (-0.73)
religion5 -0.260 0.769 -0.545 0.351
(-0.16) (0.7) (-0.34) (0.19)
religion6 -0.610 0.131 -0.773 -2.084
(-0.56) (0.17) (-0.63) (-1.98)
occupation2 -0.508 0.789 0.950 0.673
(-0.56) (1.48) (1.28) (0.86)
occupation3 -0.712 0.828 1.674 0.469
(-0.81) (1.63) (1.61) (0.61)
occupation4 -4.933 0.405 2.765 -0.389
(-3.17) (0.92) (1.55) (-0.39)
occupation5 -1.163 0.715 0.683 0.641
(-1.45) (1.21) (0.68) (0.73)
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Table 3 (continued)
Housework equations Market work equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Characteristics of the spouse (continued)
industry2 -1.206 -0.122 1.828 0.199
(-1.22) (-0.1) (2.05) (0.11)
industry3 -1.850 0.316 0.961 -0.918
(-2.16) (0.73) (0.97) (-0.75)
industry4 -1.660 -0.168 3.878 0.810
(-1.76) (-0.3) (3.24) (0.72)
industry5 -1.955 -0.154 0.523 0.106
(-2.8) (-0.28) (0.68) (0.09)
work weeks 0.106 0.017 -0.018 -0.064
(3.11) (1.71) (-0.51) (-4.14)
Characteristics of the couple
child1 3.033 0.286 -0.551 0.834
(3.91) (0.52) (-0.49) (0.91)
child2 5.593 1.009 -1.568 1.389
(6.75) (1.67) (-1.60) (1.46)
child3 6.719 0.504 -1.732 0.572
(5.37) (0.67) (-1.06) (0.51)
youngchild 0.817 -0.160 -2.689 -1.084
(1.31) (-0.35) (-2.83) (-1.08)
add hh members 1.386 -0.593 -0.365 -0.332
(1.18) (-0.72) (-0.31) (-0.20)
rooms -0.121 0.176 _       _       
(-0.87) (1.87)
cars -0.283 0.202 _       _       
(-0.97) (1.1)
age power -2.918 -2.588 -13.302 11.305
(-0.15) (-0.42) (-0.91) (0.88)
education power 26.302 5.309 9.673 9.918
(2.39) (1.38) (1.00) (1.02)
sex power -23.857 -10.598 31.421 50.517
(-1.42) (-0.86) (0.99) (2.20)
respondent -0.312 -2.592 -0.011 -0.433
(-0.6) (-9.98) (-0.02) (-0.64)
constant 19.424 12.715 -1.374 -26.342
(2.29) (1.77) (-0.09) (-1.49)
R 2 0.298 0.120 0.644 0.486
Notes: The results are OLS estimations. Observations are weighted using sampling 
weights. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering across strata and sampling units. 
The t-statistics are in the brackets.
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Table 4: Summary of the marginal effects of power within an interactive time allocation model for the median couple 
Dependent Variables:
Wife Husband Husband
Independent (0 hrs) (1-39 hrs) (40-44 hrs) (>44 hrs) (>44 hrs)
Variables Observed frequencies: 0.08 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.55
wife 60 12 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 *** -0.01 -0.05 *** -0.01
husband 7 60 -0.01 ** -0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01
wife -8 *** 4 **     -     -     -     - -0.01 **
husband 4 * -5 *** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00     -
less -31 26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
more -68 29 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01
less -52 15 0.03 * 0.04 * -0.02 -0.05 * -0.03
more 47 -13 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03
less -9 11 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.03
more -14 78 * -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.10 *
less 99 ** -35 * 0.12 *** 0.10 *** -0.09 ** -0.13 *** -0.02
more -38 -43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Housework Market work
Housework
Wife
(minutes) (probabilities)
Wage power
Notes: The marginal effects for the housework (market work) variables are calculated using the estimated coefficients of OLS (ordered probit) regressions and 
are expressed in minutes (probabilities). The median couple is composed of a wife who does 40 hours of market work and 15 hours of housework, and a 
husband who does 48 hours of market work and 6 hours of housework. */**/*** represent statistical significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels, respectively. 
Statistically significant results are indicated in bold.
Market work
Age power
Education power
Sex power
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Table 5: The mechanisms of intraspousal time allocation, in function of power
Housework equations Market work equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Personal characteristics of the individual
age 0.260 -0.112 0.003 0.017
(4.94) (-4.1) (0.28) (1.87)
age2 -0.004 -0.007 0.000 0.001
(-0.73) (-2.43) (-0.38) (1.53)
edudummy2 -0.293 1.526 -0.172 0.081
(-0.19) (2.82) (-1.27) (0.53)
edudummy3 0.017 2.502 -0.274 0.180
(0.01) (3.37) (-1.83) (0.82)
race2 -2.438 0.286 -0.048 -0.346
(-2.82) (0.64) (-0.42) (-2.24)
race3 -2.417 0.640 -0.268 -0.148
(-1.38) (1.07) (-1.47) (-0.59)
religion2 -0.006 -0.278 -0.104 0.061
(-0.01) (-0.77) (-0.97) (0.81)
religion3 -0.884 -1.027 -0.035 -0.060
(-0.93) (-1.34) (-0.2) (-0.25)
religion4 -3.313 -0.201 -0.551 -0.012
(-2.67) (-0.27) (-2.36) (-0.07)
religion5 -0.166 -1.204 -0.118 -0.420
(-0.1) (-1.77) (-0.84) (-1.79)
religion6 -2.167 0.422 -0.131 -0.142
(-3.03) (0.71) (-1.11) (-1.11)
Labor market characteristics of the individual
lwagehat -3.655 0.360 0.271 0.132
(-2.83) (0.51) (1.42) (0.78)
lwagehat2 -3.828 0.384 -0.084 0.110
(-0.93) (0.25) (-0.24) (0.47)
lwagehat*job2 -1.856 _       _       _       
(-3.95)
lwagehat*job3 -1.987 _       _       _       
(-3.60)
lwagehat*job4 -2.118 -0.342 _       _       
(-3.79) (-2.60)
lwagehat2*job2 6.810 _       _       _       
(1.40)
lwagehat2*job3 7.161 _       _       _       
(1.19)
lwagehat2*job4 4.078 0.422 _       _       
(0.50) (0.24)
weeksdummy2 _       _       0.576 6.427
(3.23) (13.59)
weeksdummy3 _       _       0.592 6.532
(3.5) (13.8)
unemployment rate 4.520 5.171 0.369 -6.113
(0.20) (0.26) (0.09) (-1.32)
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Table 5 (continued)
Housework equations Market work equations
Wife Husband Wife Husband
Characteristics of the couple
child1 2.070 -0.243 0.001 0.146
(2.77) (-0.54) (0.01) (1.56)
child2 3.753 0.137 -0.074 0.174
(4.50) (0.24) (-0.81) (1.13)
child3 4.107 -0.661 0.132 -0.064
(3.19) (-0.96) (0.9) (-0.41)
youngchild 1.834 -0.483 -0.226 -0.046
(2.59) (-1.00) (-2.04) (-0.39)
rooms -0.161 0.233 _       _       
(-1.13) (2.57)
cars -0.335 0.219 _       _       
(-1.18) (1.15)
agepwrlo -0.518 0.430 -0.001 -0.028
(-0.75) (1.09) (-0.02) (-0.32)
agepwrhi -1.127 0.483 0.084 0.158
(-1.38) (1.22) (0.74) (1.04)
edupwrlo -0.859 0.248 -0.179 -0.081
(-1.19) (0.74) (-1.98) (-0.93)
edupwrhi 0.784 -0.219 -0.082 -0.065
(1.09) (-0.59) (-0.95) (-0.72)
sexratiopwrlo -0.146 0.183 -0.047 -0.246
(-0.18) (0.36) (-0.46) (-2.05)
sexratiopwrhi -0.232 1.300 0.133 0.081
(-0.35) (1.98) (1.28) (0.66)
wagepwrlo 1.643 -0.577 -0.543 0.064
(2.26) (-1.83) (-5.85) (0.57)
wagepwrhi -0.641 -0.723 0.013 -0.051
(-1.06) (-1.49) (0.18) (-0.53)
marketworkhat -0.131 -0.082 _       _       
(-3.6) (-3.73)
houseworkhat _       _       -0.087 0.015
(-5.59) (0.72)
houseworkhat2 _       _       -0.005 _       
(-3.6)
marketworkhat, spouse 0.069 0.060 0.005 -0.015
(1.78) (2.61) (1.05) (-2.08)
houseworkhat, spouse 0.111 0.202 0.067 -0.024
(0.69) (3.17) (4.39) (-1.17)
constant 22.404 5.264 -0.964 -5.846
(6.68) (3.09) (-1.97)
constant2 _       _       0.021 _       
(0.04)
constant3 _       _       1.196 _       
(2.54)
Notes: The housework results are OLS estimations. The market work results are 
ordered probit estimations. Observations are weighted using sampling weights. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering across strata and sampling units. The t-
statistics are in the brackets.
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